

Does present academic research support current theories relating to transnational policy & what can be learnt from the global diffusion of participatory budgeting?

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Signed:



Tom Mills ~

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Abstract:

This paper reviews over 30 recent case studies to ascertain as to whether current academic research supports the theories regarding transnational policy in its three forms; Diffusion, Convergence & learning. In association with this a better understanding as to the process of transnational policy will be unearthed using the example of Participatory Budgeting. The initial literature analysis will look at all three topics to create an analytical framework in which the meta-analysis will focus. The analysis of the case studies will show that there is validation for current research into diffusion and convergence, although somewhat lacking in the topic of learning. As a current and relatively new area of academic research this paper aims to instigate further research into the current standing of transnational policy, with foresight to improve understanding and knowledge for all academics in the field of transnational policy.

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Diffusion:

- Municipality
- Central Government
- Citizens
- Organisations
- Communication

Convergence:

- Municipality
- Central Government
- Citizens
- Organisations
- Education
- Cost Implications

Learning:

- Municipality
- Central Government
- Citizens
- Organisations
- Education
- Communication
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Chapter 1 - Introduction:

Over recent years transnational policy has become a key method for transferring effective policy measures across national boundaries. It offers the chance for developed and undeveloped countries alike to transfer their most efficient and effective policies, to improve cities and nations as a whole.

Why transnational policy?

In order to research any topic in relation to planning, it's important to first comprehend what planning is and the multitude of derivatives associated with it. Alexander (1992) refers to planning as "the deliberate social or organisational activity of developing an optimal strategy of future action to achieve a desired set of goals". These strategies are fundamental to how planning is approached. Strategies aim to solve complex problems in complex contexts. As a result a great deal of resources and power are required in order to enact such strategies.

Strategies are formulated due to a number of contexts that arise in a specific area. These contexts formulate the policy required often through "intensely political and value laden" aspects" (Wachs 1995).

Planning is essentially the management of urban space and over time, and has developed complex approaches in order to better suite its environmental context. With many areas differing in; size, scale, history and context, bespoke strategies are required to deal with individual needs and necessities of a location.

Replicating the success for these strategies has always proved difficult. Healey (2012) believes that through a 'community of enquirers', we as planners have to debate and discourse planning strategies to improve them. This is a certifiable way of improving strategies, but there must be a more rigorous and specific way of analysing successful strategies and applying them to different contexts.

Healey concerns herself with Planning; concepts, techniques, instruments and the general idea of planning itself. More importantly she focuses on how these ideas are transferred globally and the repercussions of such transnational approaches. Our past approach being based on a linear concept of a singular development trajectory. Healey delves into issues regarding cultural relativism specifically when applying a planning approach to another country. In addition she also states how a locations geography and history play a key role in how well a plan can be implemented. planners need to build narrative and discuss these transitional plans through acknowledging the history of locations. Secondly she asserts a need to define the contingent idea of planning as a whole through debates with a 'community of enquirers'. Healey validates these assumptions and claims through cross comparative case studies.

The premise of Healey's paper focuses around the case study of Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1980. She describes the use of 'participatory budgeting'. The history of which resulted from the fall of a dictatorship and tough working/living conditions. As a result, power was devolved to communities to allow them to input what local budgets should be spent on and how they have directed a rise in resources being spent to improve local areas. The concept became popular and began infiltrating European cities, specifically the UK. Healey points out the issue of simply uprooting a policy and planting it in another location/city with a differing contextual history. This lead her to the concept of an 'origin narrative'.

Similar to this, is research from the academic Booth (2011), who looks into the theory of 'path dependency', which has become an adequate method of understanding the 'temporal dimension in comparison'. He backs such a theory and references Gains (2005) who appreciates and acknowledges its use by both 'economists and political scientists'. This idea ultimately offers a way of explaining 'historical phenomena' and explains the 'influence of past events'. Mahoney (2000) sums up the whole the whole theory by describing path dependency as a way of characterising 'specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties'.

Booth offers a more in-depth look at the theory. Whilst both, 'origin narrative' and 'path dependency', ultimately represent the same ideological values, Booth reinforces the theory with more evidence than Healey. However, whilst Booth has supported his findings with other academics in a more scientific manner, he lacks the real world application that Healey has provided with her case study, making her paper more credible in the real world.

Definitions:

Urban Policy – Urban policy is formulation of specific policies affecting the urban environment, in the context of; political, environmental, economic and social factors. The resolute application is in accordance with development strategies in order to continue meeting the needs of today without jeopardising the resources of tomorrow. Urban policies should aim to rectify current issues within specific geospatial areas and how to manage them efficiently.

International – international focuses on the ideas of nations with borders. These borders therefore create communication in spite of their boundaries between and amongst nation states.

Transnational – Transnational is the social connection between people/groups with shared interests across countries despite of their boundaries. The end result is a shared account of functional processes from one country to another, in order to ascertain a more productive outcome, for all or a single party. Transnational is a form of globalisation removing boundaries to open the realms of discourse globally.

Policy Learning – Policy learning is the process of educating an entity, based up on the previous results of a specific policy. This allows actors to interpret the positives and negatives of a policy, in order to comprehend its benefits and usefulness and to advance its application and applicability.

Policy Convergence – Policy convergence refers to the hybridisation of two or more policies. Converging features might include objectives or instruments that are involved. Convergence can be seen as a finalised process of a newly emerging policy based on previously utilised methods.

Policy Diffusion – Historically academics deemed policy diffusion as the effects one policy has upon a surrounding geographical area, in essence a butterfly effect. Previously measures assessed neighbouring regions, in geographic proximity, to assess how far policy had diffused from its source. More recently however due to transnationalism this is more difficult to track due to its capability to travel without consideration of national borders.

Current Discourse in Transnational Urban Policy:

Urban planning initiatives are unlikely to succeed without an adequate understanding of the diversity of urban contexts. Collectively, demographic, size, spatial and economic factors, mediated by globalisation and location, are of paramount importance in revisiting urban planning and determining the ways in which it should be reoriented and strengthened in order to make it more relevant.

Whilst transnational discourse has been a focus of Saunier (2008) for decades more recent academics such as Healey have discoursed its function and meaning within the urban planning sphere. The topic of transnational policy has a historical grounding and as a result has a large amount of literature associated with it.

Many academics have renamed this topic urban policy mobility' (McCann 2010), and with its new terminology it has attracted more literature to the topic of discourse. This however should not ignore previous work, focusing on the history of transnational urban policies (Saunier, 2008). His work shows a particular emphasis on the role of the professional bodies and associations involved in the policies that are being produced. This creates a useful counterpoint to "flow methodologies" and "policy genealogies" (Peck J and Theodore N (2010a) & Peck J and Theodore N (2010b)), which Clarke (2011) views as stereotypical methods used currently by geographers.

One of the most prominent and important points to acquire from transnational policies is the fact that policies "move as they move" (Clarke, 2011) because whilst they are relational they are also territorial and as a result in order to make policies adaptable they must be de-territorialised and then reterritorialised, as they are a process of "transformation" (Peck and Theodore, 2010a).

Chapter 2 - Literature Review:

Historical Context:

Pierre-Yves Saunier is a historian of transnationalism seeking to historicise globalisation studies (Saunier, 2008). He is one of a number of historians working to convince social scientists that transnational interdependencies and connections are not new, do not simply have their roots in the 1960s and 1970s, and cannot be confined to particular historical periods such as the medieval and early-modern period, or the last three or four decades. More specifically, Saunier is a historian of the transnational municipal movement seeking to territorialise histories of transnationalism (Ewen, 2008).

The historical gaze makes clear that urban policy mobility is not new and cannot simply be confined to particular historical moments, such as the medieval and early-modern period or the last three to four decades. The historical method begins with organisations of various kinds, from municipalities to philanthropic foundations, and from municipal associations to international institutions. It does this for practical reasons, because historical research depends on archived documents. Such a starting point brings into focus the full breadth of attempts to mobilise urban policy, some of which succeed while others fail. This view is lacking in studies of contemporary urban policy mobility, which 'follow the [successfully mobilised] policy' using 'flow methodologies' (Peck and Theodore, 2010a).

Saunier's work takes a more historical approach into the concept of transnational policy, but with a focus upon local level authorities. His initial research points to seminar like forums in which those involved in solving urban issues for the benefit of its citizens formed communities.

This evolution was a key step in the forming of issues aroused by urban development. Of course this changed during the First World War with the international necessity to "organise" and "rationalise" thinking in the context of urban development. The war premeditated the structure of political institutions that voiced real concerns and issues that needed to be addressed, which previous to the fact, had only been discoursed by people such as academics.

Whilst globalisation of technology could be a causal factor for the development of these communities, it has been the "men of goodwill", who intern specified cities and the focus of their attentions, creating the "Urban international". The aim of this Urban international was to bring urban planning to the forefront of their discourse. Seeking for a balance of economy and politics, by

furthering social and geographical aspects through rationalisation and of professionalisation. The result of such a formation has led to a breakdown of cultural barriers and globalised international thinking, not just through academics, but also through; scientists, lawyers, government officials and elected representatives.

Whilst the idea of breaking down international barriers has helped promote the discussion off issues within the urban sphere, language became a difficult component. Language being relevant to one culture may have differing meanings and connotations, thus leading to Saunier's 'struggle for definition'. This means translation can become a major issue when dealing with transnational policy, being transferred from one country to another. Ultimately, the international has brought real time issues to the forefront of the urban sphere, in an attempt to answer questions and help benefit countries with a holistic approach to their cities.

Saunier is suggesting that a real concept that needs to be understood when comprehending the idea of transnational policy is the idea of universalisation. The way in which we; act, perceive specific concepts or strategies and how they are transmitted further afield in more than just the contextual environment that they were conceived within. Subsequently, we must acknowledge the influence of power within this universalisation, despite it being repudiated or concealed. Despite this there will always be differences within intellectual exchange. No one municipality will have the same background context and knowledge as the original system, irrespective of economic or political status, on both sides.

Rasmussen re-affirms this point by highlighting that during 1860 and 1914 that transnational policy certainly occurred by transfer, in association with the transfer came the attribution of congresses or associations, and as a result transnational policy was not only constrained to the geographical nature of such issues. A need to follow trends in international exchanges is key, but in doing so when we transfer, we should reconstruct the previous actors and causal factors such as; people, texts and ideas.

Healey modernises Saunier's ideas, however she fails to acknowledge a need to appreciate the cultural differences within certain areas. That certain definitions, values and norms are prerequisite and bespoke to certain areas, and that in some instances these simply cannot be replicated. This ultimately is causal to the different and opposing universalisation projects around the world.

Policy Diffusion:

Diffusion is often thought of as a ripple in a pool with the Policy being diffused at the centre. As more people appreciate and accept the value of the policy, ripples move outward in waves and other countries are affected by the policy, or in other words adopt the said policy.

Graham (2013) defines diffusion as a way in which policy adoptions can be interdependent, where a country or state observes what other countries or states have done and conditions its own policy decisions on these observations.

Dolowitz & Marash (2000) offer the most commonly utilised definition of policy diffusion. They sight the term as 'knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting'.

Diffusion however differs from transfer in 5 key aspects as Marsh & Sharman suggest (2009):

Key links between diffusion and transfer:

1. First, work in each area can benefit from a greater focus on the changing interactions between the various mechanisms involved in diffusion/transfer.
2. Second, the diffusion literature privileges structure, while the transfer literature privileges agency, but we need an approach which recognises the dialectical relationship between the two.
3. Third, the diffusion literature concentrates on pattern-finding, while the transfer literature examines process-tracing, but any full explanation of transfer/diffusion needs to do both.
4. Fourth, both literatures suffer from skewed case selection with, in particular, too little attention paid to developing countries.
5. Finally, while both literatures need to be interested in whether diffusion/transfer is likely to be successful/unsuccessful, neither considers any criteria that might be used to establish policy success and failure.

Graham (2013) narrowed down 4 key points related to diffusion, which offer a more stringent direct approach to understanding diffusion:

- **Learning** – states act as “laboratories of democracy” in which the actors have to solve issues through policy usage. Learning about policy success is key, but addressing why failures occur is also important.
- **Competition** – this can be for outcomes related to policies such as “tax bases” or “economic conditions”, which helps to regulate the evolution of such policies through global competitive situations.
- **Coercion** – Vertically, this coercion is related to agents not part of the government that considered adopting or has adopted a certain policy. Horizontally however refers to one government pressurising another into adopting a policy, perhaps through sanctions on smaller countries, to force a countries hand upon implementing changes to policy.
- **Socialisation** – This became an important aspect of diffusion during the acceptance that international relations are historically and socially constructed, and that this created the normalisation for understanding such politics. However, internal actors also play a key role in that they can help create or reject norms for local conditions.

Whilst transnational policy as a process has been dissected, none of the section has been brought together as a useable standardised model (Knill, 2005). This disparity created from not linking each close field, creates a growing wedge between each schism. By unifying each term and distinguishing how each interacts with the other, the discourse in transnational policy may well be better understood and adapted to academics and policy makers.

The difference in current discourse on diffusion in comparison to transfer is that diffusion literature uses quantitative analysis to look at multiple case studies. In comparison transfer uses qualitative methods, however looks at smaller numbers of case studies. With diffusion being a highly susceptible to cultural relevance, the use of quantitative data ignores this key issue (Marsh & Sharman, 2009). The use of quantitative however does not offer an important and new way of looking at diffusion

The vast majority of research in diffusion focuses upon positive cases that have successfully been diffused from other countries through transnational policy. Graham (2013) supports this highlighting whereby power and information are decentralised, and barriers to exchange of ideas and discourse are lessening.

As with learning it is important to take into consideration success and failure. Only studying success means a negative emergence, or ignorance, as to why diffusion fails in some cases. Failure can often teach us as much about progressing as success can. Marsh & Sharman suggest a “race to the bottom” has occurred and that this has resulted in a global competition. With capital being so easy to move in a world empowered by technology and communication, standards are being set whereby specific requirements are required in order for success to occur.

Less success leads to less investment into this area and so creates a survival of the most diffused in terms of policy agglomerated affairs. Those last to acknowledge and accept the diffusion of such policies are more likely to lose out in the scale of global competitiveness.

With the emergence of a ‘tipping point’ as suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), there is a real need in the current requirement to further understand policy diffusion. As competition becomes more global so do the needs to accumulate and recreate successful policy occur. When one country reaps the benefits of another’s policy application, more and more become willing to experiment and implement the said policy. Once the policy has diffused to enough countries it becomes plausible that a metaphoric tipping point occurs, in which a ‘rush’ to replicate becomes apparent.

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) raise a pivotal point regarding diffusion and its relation to transnational policy as a whole. Whilst it can be used as an independent or dependent variable to explain change/success/failure, it can also be used to explain under which situations diffusion is more likely to occur. This knowledge is priceless in the on going research, meaning its research relationship is not mutually exclusive to one factor of explanation.

Whilst diffusion and transfer differ they are both important devices in policy change and evolution. The evolution of policy cannot naturally progress without movement. However bias has been shown only to those that have been successful. The learning process is dichotomous in its web of knowledge. On the one hand research focuses on successes of policy diffusion. Whilst a lot can be learnt from these positive outcomes more so can be learnt from failures. This is a topical area that needs much further research and dedication.

Policy Convergence:

Knill (2005) defines convergence as “Any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy across a given set of political jurisdictions over a given period of time”. With this in mind convergence stands as two sets of policies that must adapt with each other for the benefit of the entity adopting a diffused policy.

Bennett (1991) describes policy convergence in 5 succinct points, which culminate to give a better picture of convergence:

1. A confluence of intent to deal with common policy problems
2. Formal manifestations of government policy
3. In relation to policy instruments; the institutional tools available to administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial
4. Convergence may occur through policy outcomes, impacts or consequences
5. Convergence of policy style - by which policy responses are formulated

This would suggest that policy convergence could be the direct result of policy transfer and diffusion, with convergence being the final outcome of such processes. These processes are often affected by a multitude of external factors, from; “international organisations” to “shared interests among states”.

With the ideology that “societies grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances”, it becomes clear that convergence at the heart of its definition shows a move towards a reflection of policy, in a mirror of differing proximity.

The “general convergence argument”, as Bennett refers to it, holds an intrinsic belief that industrial infrastructure plays a key role in the formation of; social, political and public policies. This leads to the possibility of economic and development that converges to create a specifically similar set of “post-industrial conditions”. This brings into question the differences a communist and capitalist regime could instill and promote. However Bennet focuses less upon 'societal convergence', and more on 'policy convergence' along with comparative public policy.

This comparison takes into account industrial and economic development and its effect. This effect is essentially the causation that promotes the difference created between countries and what leads to a convergence of policy to solve any disparities created within the process.

Bennett implies a need to break away from stereotypical norms and pre-existing sectors often associated with policy categories. Thus in order to study cross-national policy convergence a need to break the cultural normality of sectoring is required to equitably assess policy.

Policy Learning:

Policy learning has been a key aspect of transnational policy, in which Rose (1991) has discoursed the topic rigorously. He assumes the need to understand the specifics of a circumstance that leads to the effective transfer of one policy to another, and that this is what needs to be understood in order for academics alike to learn.

Lesson drawing is defined by rose as “instructive knowledge” and “a conclusion about a subject drawn after the fact from observation or experience”.

Whilst most research relies upon trial and error, policy learning is the research and development aspect of transnational policy. At its most basic, if a policy is successful it is more likely to be transferred and diffused, where as if it fails, the policy will either be discarded altogether or edited to make it more bespoke and efficient.

Whilst policy is important, policy itself doesn't learn. It is in fact the actors involved in policy that decide whether it is successful or not. Policymakers are referred to as “social engineers” Rose (1991). This type of research is most effective in part because it doesn't rely on theory, but physical causations that have occurred; this is, factual experiences that help decide upon the progression or regression of a policy. This final decision logically can lead to the transference of a policy to a different location, from where it is being operated.

Whilst success has to be measured in policy learning, it is the transferability of a policy that is most evaluated in lesson drawing. This is achieved through observations and carrying forward the results of success or failures into a coherent format that can dictate whether or not transferability can occur.

Much of the academic discourse involving lesson learning in policy utilises single case studies. A gap in the research agenda for this allows understanding as to why one policy worked in one country but not another. However, it doesn't take into consideration whether the successful policy implemented in one country could then work for another country.

Issues surrounding lesson drawing are numerous. Whilst Saunier (2008) emphasises the historical context surrounding policy, there is a tendency for policy makers to ignore efforts to prioritise past occurrences and simply try to replicate “past events ‘for advocacy or for comfort’”. This kind of ignorance towards policy can lead to ineffective situations, and observations that ultimately add an unnecessary risk to policy diffusion and taints the pool of knowledge being accrued by researchers and policymakers.

Interestingly the size of cities can affect the lesson drawing process. Local authorities of small cities may look to neighbouring locations to imitate or replicate successful policy measures. However, bigger cities must look further afield for inspiration, even to the extent of national perspectives in order to attain policies that may match their required need of policy satisfaction.

Ensuring that all aspects of a policy are assessed and replicated is a key part of lesson drawing. Whilst borrowing one policy from either another country, nationally or even based on proximity, many policy makers are known to only replicate the easier implementable aspects of transnational policy, and ignoring the more difficult aspects required for successful application (Muniak, 1985). Time is clearly a variable in the process of policy learning. Policy makers sometimes require a quick fix and therefore need to cut the time it takes to implement a policy. However with more time, more learning can be achieved and with this learning comes a higher success of implementing specific policies. This makes time a very relevant and crucial factor in policy lesson drawing and diffusion.

Chapter 3 - Methodology:

Meta Analysis:

The chosen methodology of this research report is meta-analysis. Meta analysis is a quantitative approach that “synthesises “ and “integrates” results from a multitude of case studies focused on a specific area of research (Beck, 2011). Whilst Meta analysis is often associated with Medical studies, more and more researchers are utilising its methodology in the academic field of planning. One such prime example being Alberti (1999) in her study of urban patterns and environmental performance.

Meta analysis can be thought of as a methodological approach of sifting “through mountains of potentially contradictory research to uncover the nuggets of knowledge that lie buried underneath” (Stanley, 2001). This type of methodology allows the accumulation of past literature and case studies to help refine definitions and findings to give a concrete summary and more conclusive outcomes (Evangelou, 2007). It would seem meta-analysis has become more and more accepted as a scientific practice in evaluating the large volumes of data. As Hunt (1997) states, it is “how science takes stock”.

The meta analysis offers an alternative to the narrative review of literature that is often used. The case studies are effectively the sample and the results of each study are converted to statistics often referred to as the “effect size” (Beck, 2011). Specifically for this meta-analysis a matrix system will be utilised in order to create the effect size. The vertical axis of the matrix will hold three specific topics related to Transnational Policy. The horizontal axis will contain each article reviewed. Following intensive reviews of each piece of literature (horizontal axis) a Boolean result of yes or no will be added to each box in relation to the three topics (vertical axis). At the end of the meta analysis a percentage will be calculated at the end of each topic based on the Boolean responses from the synthesis of articles and case studies. This percentage can then be mapped and graphed on a spider diagram. This will indicate the validity of each topic based upon current and previous case studies. From this not only will the magnitude of validity be apparent but also offer new potential routes for academic research to progress such end results.

| | Article 1 | Article 2 | Article 3 | Article 4 | Article 5 | Article 6 | Article 7 | Article 8 | Article 9 |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Topic 1 Policy convergence | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y | N | N |
| Topic 2 Policy Learning | N | N | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | Y |
| Topic 3 Policy Diffusion | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | Y |

Table 1: *Table showing an example of the matrix required to accommodate the meta-analysis results*
(Source: Author)

Once the results have been synthesised together they will be plotted on a radar graph, thus using statistical inference to conclude the research report (Stamatis, 2012).

This statistical procedure allows an objective appraisal in comparison to previous narrative reviews, and can offer an explanation as to the heterogeneity of results produced for each individual study (Egger 1997).

Whilst the meta-analysis offers a better methodological approach, it does possess some weaknesses. Each individual study used, will have been deemed acceptable only by the researcher conducting the meta analysis, therefore it leads the researcher into a bias. This bias can be seen in the form of only acknowledging positive results that reinforce the hypothesis. Subsequently each study may have its own weakness that could impact upon the final results being produced.

The use of meta-analysis fits well in the assessment of current planning policy literature. With multiple sources aiding the academic resource into transnational policy, meta-analysis can help combine and clear the perspective and knowledge required to further its evolution. It can help actors within the field of policy planning whether to diffuse a policy into their local area, and appreciate the efficiency required in implementing such policies. The meta-analysis will focus on all research studies, whether positive or negative in an attempt to produce an unbiased result.

Three Key topics to be analysed by the meta-analysis:

- **Diffusion** (Participatory Budgeting)
- **Convergence** (Participatory Budgeting)
- **Learning** (Participatory Budgeting)

The criteria in order to decide whether each case study is relevant will be based on generic criteria that can be applied to each case study for each topic. For diffusion, each case study will have to make reference within the chosen text to how Participatory Budgeting (PB) as been diffused to the relevant country or countries being analysed. In this instance taking into account the context of the host of the PB model or acknowledging previous host municipalities and their evolution of the policy will be sufficient to warrant a yes criteria.

For convergence the criteria will require reference to the implementation of the PB model. Either positive or negative results in relation to; community, governmental structure, or legal frameworks will be sufficient.

Finally for learning the criteria will require the text to reference lesson having been learnt from the model. Again regardless as to whether this is positive or negative, this will be sufficient to evaluate each case study. If a text adheres to these criteria a yes will be noted within the matrix. If a text fails to meet these specific criterions a no will be noted in the matrix framework.

The case studies have been chosen through the utilisation of the University of West of England's academic search engine. This gave a basis for the majority of case studies to be reviewed, however as transnational policy discourse is considered a globally applicable premise, a further search was conducted in Google to ensure all continents (within reason) were included, For example Africa and Australia. The minimum requirement for each continent is two case studies. This will be sufficient to gather enough information regarding the topics being analysed. As the previous literature review found, there is a lack of developing countries, hence the requirement for two case studies from each continent.

The main aim of the research will be to quantify whether current research is validated by the case studies that have been carried out over the past 6 years. Whilst the topic of transnational policy is new it is important to ensure theory can be validated through other researchers knowledge and analysis. The matrix framework will be the primary research to validate, however a secondary result will be as important in the form of furthering knowledge. Each case study will provide differing contexts around the world, some of which may overlap, however this could further strengthen theory regarding each topic or shed light on ambiguity's within the research. The collection of data and results from each case study will provide vital information, which will be collated at the end. The final outcomes of which will lead to suggestions and ways to further the knowledge of transnational policies.

Whilst the primary focus of this research paper is transnational policy, the extraneous variable presented is Participatory Budgeting. Lessons from PB will be used to validate transnational policy, however at the end it will be important to evaluate Participatory budgeting and how transnational policy research can further such examples. As the literature on Diffusion states, looking for patterns and correlations is an important part of the analytical work and will provide suggestions for further research.

Case studies:

A meta-analysis involves looking at case studies and therefore it is important to acknowledge the implication of using case studies in a methodological approach.

Yin (1994. Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing) proposes 4 uses for a multiple case study analysis:

1. To explain complex causal links in real-life interventions
2. To describe the real-life context in which the intervention has occurred
3. To describe the intervention itself
4. To explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear set of outcomes.

All 4 of the uses specified apply to this area of research, making a multiple case study analysis key to completing the thesis being proposed.

The usage of a case study analysis in research offers an approach, which can analyse complex social units consisting of a multitude of variables. These variables will help analyse and understand the complexity of the transnational policy and its application in other scenarios. The case study methodology also perceives a narrative that reflects real life situations and offers a somewhat universal and unpolluted account. This can offer particular understanding in regards to a specific theme within a research topic and ultimately offer the necessary facts in order to bring about a suggestive outcome to help answer a hypothesis. The most important aspect of a case study is that it provides an excellent example of the desired situation looking to be explored. This situation can in turn offer a template for future use of the exemplified situation and thus transferred.

A major issue with using a cross comparative study is that generalisations can be made using selective parts of a case study. This can lead to misinterpretation of results and selective use of data, which will essentially manipulate findings to the user's needs and requirements. This is a choice the researcher has, however, when manipulating the data this can ultimately affect the validity of the conclusions drawn. This is a decision the researcher must at least appreciate when using this particular method and as a result acknowledge the ethical issues surrounding this.

This a case study can also be queried for its representative factor. Some researchers believe case study research is too subjective and excludes certain situation factors that are possibly deemed as important for non-bias representation. Others in contrast believe that case studies are effectively a random sampling method and that it does account for indifference. In this respect they represent a "real life" sample that represents that given situation, therefore it narrows down external factors that influence the analysed situation or phenomena being studied.

Hypothesis:

Academic research currently supports all three aspects of transnational policy; diffusion, convergence and learning.

Research Question:

Does present academic research support current theories relating to transnational policy & what can be learnt from the global diffusion of participatory budgeting?

Chapter 4 - Meta-Analysis:

Diffusion

Bland (2011) culminates the Latin American evolution of PB by suggesting, “There is no single PB model; rather, each application is determined by the particular political, social, and economic context within which it is applied”. However, as PB evolved in South America due to the social injustice presented by years of oppression, it would therefore suggest these circumstances would be required elsewhere for diffusion to occur and for PB to be effective. Bland suggests 4 key characteristics required for successful diffusion:

- The executive of the PB process must want to devolve power to citizens initially.
- There must be enough financial support or resources to support projects that are produced from the process.
- Political decentralisation
- Citizens must have independent decision-making authority in order to be listened to by officials in charge of the policy.

Municipality:

Fourie & Reutener (2012) supports Leduka’s Mantsopa (South Africa) case study in the inefficiency of diffusion within a given area, specifically relating to contextual social backgrounds exhibited. In contrast however this doesn’t apply politically, the root of which stems from members of the local municipality not integrating the necessary PB policy and giving it enough power to make decisions. This would suggest in order for diffusion to take place effectively a structural change of governance is required for it to adequately function.

Ahmad & Weiser (2006) adhere to the understanding of political change required for diffusion to successfully occur. They found that diffusion of a policy like PB in Indonesia was less likely to be successful unless “high degrees of political commitment” as well as a “sophisticated process to aggregate the high level of demand for development funds”.

Wu & Wang (2011) acknowledge the fact that the PB model is relatively new in its

transnational diffusion across the globe. They believe that “few definitive statements can be made on what makes PB successful or unsuccessful”. Their analysis in China found that Wuxi has presented a successful implementation of PB, however academic attention has been overshadowed by the more successful attempts in Wenling, and hence a separate research investigation solely upon Wuxi. The key insight drawn from Wuxi is the fact that it introduces the PB model into the budget compilation process of the government. This has a knock on effect specifically on policy outcomes, which will in turn attract more localities to adopt these positive changes. Wu & Wang have created a 6-step implementation checklist:

1. What is the procedure of PB? (Generally annual, therefore the participation should be factored into the governments schedule)
2. Who has the authority to organize PB? (Which organisations are in control?)
3. What is the criteria of resource distribution? (budgeting priorities among regions at different levels of development / ranking of programs according to citizens' votes)
4. What should be decided through PB? (discussion on specific public infra- structure projects / general expenditure of public policies)
5. What mechanisms should be used to select citizen representatives? (Random / elected / selected)
6. Should PB be adopted by the legislative branch or the administrative branch?

This is one of the few retorts to a case study that has suggested an evolution in the adoption of a new policy. By creating this ‘framework’, the case study has in effect not only highlighted how further PB can be successfully analysed, as to whether it will be likely to be implemented successfully, but also provides a model for other countries too, to further diffusion.

Wu & Yang (2012) have supported their final conclusions of their 2011 study of Wuxi. Their findings in a more up-to-date case study found that the two towns involved in the PB of Wenling used differing methods to achieve their goals. In each case they were both successful. Thus no specific method can be applied to implement a new policy, and no rigid structure can be given in a chronological order. It would seem that this case study then highlights the ambiguity in implementing PB in different locations and that ultimately, despite PB originating from Brazil, it can be implemented in a Nation completely different, in both social and governmental aspects.

European case studies have offered intriguing insight into diffusion as a whole. Drouault (2007) found in Cordoba, Spain, that the organisations that represented societies often caused disruptions and that this is what has led to the logical implementation of PB. Having begun the implementation of PB however, it was found that the complexity and diversity of citizens lead to a “heterogenic population and fragmented associative map”. Thus the PB model needed to evolve and take into account these factors. Drouault found that these changes also embodied the political context at the time. Many citizens in Spain exhibit an animosity and distrust with politicians, who they feel they cannot effectively communicate with. As a result two issues have been solved systematically. By involving the citizens in the PB process, fewer disruptions are likely to occur and more transparency has been portrayed in order to “increase its legitimacy and communication with citizens”.

Whilst citizen participation and successful diffusion of PB into the political system is important, the incorporation of PB into the legal system can pose a more complex problem. In the case of Cordoba the “Ley de Modernización Del Gobierno Local (Law of local government modernization)” aimed to consolidate previous legal laws by amalgamating the previous legal landscape into a more updated and reprehensible system, taking into account PB and making participation mandatory, a step not many countries have followed. Whilst the context of Spain and Brazil differ, the end result reached in order to alleviate such national issues has ended with PB, albeit it with different methods to represent and respond to different contextual issues.

Drouault also analysed Puente Genil. Much like Cordoba it too aimed to “modernise the administration, legitimise the political system, increase democracy and enhance social justice”. The difference between the two is that Puente Genil had no sense of “associative history”. Before the 21st Century the country had no citizen participation. Gradually however, this began to change and lead to the UI (coalition of left parties) promoting and incorporating the PB model.

In 2001 the PB model was altered during its diffusion, allowing only 25% of the budget to be available, and meetings utilised thematic topics of discussion that had been previously stipulated. This evolved the following year to allow representatives of associations, municipal workers and citizens to discuss the previous years budget and its distribution. Furthermore, citizens discuss the priorities they believe to be the most important projects. Represented electives then take these prioritised projects to the council and eventually the budget is approved.

Support of these findings has arisen from Kihm (2009) who analysed Cordoba as a single case study. However, in this instance he acknowledges previous corruption of politicians as the reason for distrust amongst the citizens. As a result of this, the NGO grassroots movement known as “Red Ciudadana Principio del Principio (The Beginning of the Beginning Citizen Network)” formed. Their mantra was to hold to account politicians as they asserted themselves to incorporate PB in order to make up for the mistakes of past, distrusted, politicians. As the process became more accountable there was less need for such grassroots movement and as a result the Red Ciudadana Principio del Principio began to breakdown into a “spiritual network”. It is these grassroots’ movements that appeared in Porto Alegre that lead to the success of such a model, and highlights the contextual awareness needed in order to understand diffusion in its correct setting.

America too has began accepting the PB model and incorporating into their current system, with an emphasis upon organic “homegrown experiments” to test the water. This is much more similar to the Porto Alegre model in terms of its bottom up organization. Support has been given to large cities such as Chicago and New York (Russon-Gilman, 2013).

Several adaptations of the Porto Alegre model in Europe, the strongest social impacts are to be found in two small Italian municipalities. These are the town of Grottammare on the Adriatic coast (population 14,700), and the municipality of Pieve Emanuele (population 15,000), located not far from Milan. In both municipalities, following a change of government in the early 1990s in the wake of numerous scandals, an era of participatory politics was ushered in, that led to neglected districts being upgraded and corruption being largely pushed back. Due to the severe corruption in towns such as Grottammare and Pieve Emanuele, participation led to fundamental changes, albeit through an adaption of the Porto Alegre PB model when diffusing.

In the case of PB being diffused transnationally, as in the cases analysed by Russon-Gilman (2013) and Franklin (2005), the model of PB is drastically changed to suit the new contextual governmental structure.

Pinnington & Schugurensky (2009) noted Guelph Canada provided a positive occurrence and diffusion of PB. The model itself being coordinated by a mixture of grassroots neighborhood groups and representatives of public agencies. This formulated a coalition of governmental and citizen groups, providing an equilibrium of deliberative decision making and mutual control of certain budgetary conditions. Additional to this the presence of citizen diffusion (Russon-Gilman, 2013) was acknowledged. The city staff involved within the PB model formulated relationships with citizens. Not in a way that could influence them, but in a way in which they could utilise the resources to help; inform and guide participants, on how to minimise gaps in marginalisation, ensuring all voices are heard. This stands as a positive and efficient use of the PB system, and whilst at the time there were no further diffusions within Canada; Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver had expressed extreme interest in adopting the model in the future.

Montreal later adopted PB as a result of the success of Guelph. Considering Guelph to be a reasonably small city, for a larger city to adopt it highlights the benefits and efficiency of its diffusion. Patsias (2013) denotes a lack of trial and error experiments with PB exists, as such Guelph's PB was focused down a 'community development' approach. This obviously delineates from the intended use but does highlight the diffusion into North America and how it has become malleable to the areas needs. Whilst Guelph provided a feasible option on how to correctly implement PB, the Montreal attempt was modeled much closer on the PB model used in Porto Alegre. The PB model focused on investments that would improve local's neighborhood life. In doing so the TCEP involved in deliberating the use was in control of 10% of Montreal's entire budget. This differs from European models whose approach is based upon a top down approach, leading the citizens towards a consulting role within their PB models.

Whilst PB as a policy is meant to offer citizens a more active role in determining how funds should be spent within their locality, the current system cannot function and continue in the same manner. Thus Patsias applauds the introduction of PB to Montreal but also states, the diffusion process has led to changes in the current system. This of course is to accommodate the changes necessary to implement such a policy.

It would seem that Patsias signify the key aspect of diffusion is the harmony between political representatives as well as the citizen representatives. Compromises are necessary for both to work together. In this specific case, it is stated the PB would not have occurred without the reassurance and promotion from the mayor herself. Of course it could be argued the mayor had political reasons for using the PB model, perhaps in association with her own agenda.

Central government:

Leduka (2009) supports the premise of comprehending the diffusion and its contextual background as a key factor. Acknowledging the difference in struggles but also acknowledging the similarities of desperation and need is a key factor in diffusion. Whilst PB in Porto Alegre developed as a result of “struggles associated with organized neighbourhood associations”, South Africa’s current struggle centers around the racial divide still apparent despite the dissolution of the apartheid. This is opposed to reorganisation of government for better citizen participation in budgeting decisions. Comprehending these differences and similarities can help a policy diffuse in a more accurate environment. However, Leduka notes the hypocrisy of implementing a policy that will not integrate in the same contextual background or governmental settings. PB in Porto Alegre reorganized its governmental structure, something South Africa is not doing in order to accommodate the new policy. As a result Leduka has noted a lack of accountability and transparency within the diffusion process.

Shah (2009) found conclusively in Africa and the Middle East that similar attributes, in that the state still has a centralized system, intent on keeping its power where it is, which ultimately does not “bode well for the successful implementation of citizen budget initiatives”. This is coupled with restrictions on freedom of speech and media. The political actions themselves ignore “contestability, equality, and accountability” which are fundamental to the PB model. With Porto Alegre the key feature of the model was the organic growth of grassroots movement. Unfortunately in the Middle East and Africa organisation have been “dissolved” if found to be too critical of the state and its action. Shah found the majority of those dissolved were “calling for higher levels of participation and transparency”.

Some countries have attempted to address such matters by devolving responsibility further down to municipalities. Countries such as; Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have attempted this, however the power still remains within the centralised government. Whilst it does provide an example for change, the changes have actually led to municipalities becoming “overwhelmed” with their new daily responsibilities, without the required help and resources to carry them out.

Krenjova & Reinsalu (2013) investigated PB in Tartu, Estonia and found a different diffusion of the Porto Alegre model. The decision to use the e-Governance Academy (eGA) to become an “external expert”, led to political neutrality within the process. Due to this non-bias approach the government decided to make the eGA the leader of the PB process, effectively becoming the bridge between the citizens and the politicians involved. In order to make the process as effective as possible the eGA used academic research and deliberation meetings. A feature that also incorporated the legislative department into such deliberations. This ensured that the process was legitimate and not beyond the scope of pre-existing limits and restrictions, leading to a smooth process.

The first diffusionary step of evolution regarding PB in Tartu, actors (City government and external experts) considered allowing representatives of civic organisations into the deliberating process, however this was later decided not to be productive, and the opportunity for citizens to interact first hand was implemented. This was followed by feedback as to how the process was carried out in their ‘personal’ opinion to further improve the evolution of PB and their influence.

Additionally Krenjova & Reinsalu looked at the initial cost of PB, a topic that is often overlooked by researchers. The cost referring to the process as opposed to the budget, the largest of which was the cost of communicating to citizens in order to maximise the exposure of PB and maximise the number of citizens involved. In order to achieve this effective communication to citizens the Department of public administration was offered extra funds for effective communication, reinforcing the requirement for PB to reach citizens. The secondary costs did however refer to how much budget should be given. The end result led to a “symbolic” amount of money to be presented to the PB deliberative process. This helped reinforce the importance of such a process to the citizens and also show them a serious will from the city municipality for citizens to be actively involved. Many criticised the amount of money offered, and referred to those who proposed it as “risk takers”.

South America was the origin of the Porto Alegre PB model. Understanding the governance in its political context is key to understanding how such a policy as PB emerged. As Centner (2012) states the changes from “widespread dictatorship to neoliberal programmes of state decentralisation” has effectively given power to local municipalities, a vital and poignant change to Latin America. Previous governments also exhibited corruption forcing new governments needed to regain the trust of its citizens through empowering them and increasing transparency within the political processes affecting them. During the restructuring of Argentina experiments and pilot policies were put in place, some of which survived, despite the impending collapse of the argentine economic model in 2001. The key change being that citizens could elect a “head urban executive (Jefe de Gobierno)” instead of the Mayor being chosen by the president. This clearly paved a citizens participation into the political process, ultimately leading to the PB policy to be diffused from near by Porto Alegre.

Citizens:

In keeping with a need to appreciate and possess similar contextual backgrounds, Rahman’s (2005) Bangladesh case study does share some similarities to Porto Alegre’s PB model too. For countries to incorporate such a model, there must be an intrinsic need, and a similar circumstance required in order for the model to reach affirmation and success. Where Porto Alegre’s main concern was the welfare of deprived neighborhoods and the power asserted to them to control such decisions. In Bangladesh a similar situation has occurred where citizens’ opinions differ to those in control of development issues, specifically in the fields of;

agriculture, infrastructure and industrial sectors. More importantly the diffusion of such a model has led to the inclusion of women within the deliberating process. The Sirajganji project according to Rahman has in fact achieved this inclusion with over 1/3 of the citizens involved being women. This shows that sometimes diffusion of a model can help improve social standings of those in deprived neighborhoods, those that would otherwise have had their voices silenced.

In an Australian case Thompson (2012) focuses implementation and changes required for PB to diffuse effectively. Comparing a differing approach from China he acknowledges the randomisation of participants involved in PB.

Juxtaposed to the above findings, is Canada Bay's strategy, from a collective view as opposed to a democratic vote. Whilst this borders upon the topic of convergence, it does provide evidence of how structurally the model can be reconfigured to fit better within a society. This variation has led to an evolution of the diffused PB model. The panelists, selected to deliberate in PB, use themes as set by the council's strategic plan. This has helped to 'guide' participants in a direction more in line with the proposals set by the council, making the process much smoother. Whilst this does reduce the scope in which participants can guide funding, it does help implement the concept of PB in a more efficient and effective manner. Thompson supported this using figures that suggested an increase of participation in council meetings since PB was implemented, and also showed an increase in external time spent by those citizens involved, something that was not expected. The success of PB's diffusion is evident in that other local governments are considering the PB and how to implement as successfully as Canada Bay.

Hartz-Karp (2012), used a different case study within Australia, Greater Geraldton, which helped support Thompson's findings. The use of aggregate voting is common in most PB models, but Hartz-Karp asserts that public deliberation is now more common in such cases as Canada Bay. This change has pioneered the view that diffusion allows for culpable changes in its model in order to better adapt globally. Subsequent to this, it was found that small to medium expense projects were better suited to the community, similar to Porto Alegre. Once again providing emphatic basis for the ideology that diffusion works best under similar circumstances. The difficulty in sustaining this arises from integrating a widely supported budgetary process, inclusive of citizens, being integrated with the city's regional budget process already in use.

Shah (2009) found a difference in the diffusion of PB amongst countries other than that of Brazilian cities. Brazil's focus of PB was linked to alleviating short term, imminent needs, such as clean water. Other countries however when diffusing PB found that the process evolved and self orientated around long term planning goals.

In terms of those taking part it was also found that in Brazilian cities, individuals were involved, not representatives, making for a much more direct PB model. The process of participation is also more deliberative in Brazil than anywhere else. Annually meetings and debates are held to finalise on budget priorities. This process continues throughout the year until a final submission is made to the municipality for approval. In contrast to this, neighboring countries to Brazil; Bolivia Guatemala and Nicaragua, provide more consultive roles in the PB process. For example at least a 60% minimum level of government officials involved in the process.

In Porto Alegre, after the original workers party lost its municipal elections in early 2004, the new mayor furthered PB with his new concept of 'local solidarity governance'. The idea that all stakeholders; government, citizens and third sector parties each take on a role of their specific talents in order to improve the city. This provides a less deliberative method, however, because the PB model of Porto reinvested in the needs of those in poverty, trust had been regained and the citizens were given a seat at the table as equals, not as citizens being dedicated to by the municipality.

Franklin (2005) offers a rare indication within academic research of when diffusion does not go according to plan. Porto Alegre originated from grass roots movements that influenced from a bottom up perspective. However the mayor of Topeka in Franklin's study appears to have ignored such background when implementing his own form of PB. Instead of a naturally selecting a set of citizens to un-biasly offer their opinions on how the municipal budget should be spent or at least directed, many participants felt the citizens selected for such a task were only chosen based upon partisan support to the mayor himself. The result of such, lead to unhappiness amongst the citizens involved within the PB process.

Russon-Gilman's 2013 study, in contrast to Franklin (2005) investigates two competing cities in their use and appropriation of PB. She acknowledges the existence of differences between the originating location, Porto Alegre, and its targeted location in America. Upon such she notices 6 key differences:

- Relationship with city council
- Non-partisan frame
- Deliberative vs. representative
- District customisation
- Resource bounded
- Mobilisation vs. need.

Similarly to Franklin's findings the use of PB in America suggests that the previous bypassing of city council in Porto Alegre for uses of funding, does not occur. It would seem Chicago offers a non-partisan process. New York exhibits a bi partisan process, and finally the original PB from Brazil is a partisan framed process. In both American cases however only a small group of individuals deliberate. In contrast, Porto Alegre utilises a structured representative system and large group assemblies. Finally no representatives are elected to represent their community and views in America, contrary to the PB model in Brazil. Interestingly, much like Paice (2014) highlighted in relation to the Africities convention, Russon-Gilman explores the core reasoning for the implementation of PB, and found it was a similar forum of global context, This is an important aspect of diffusion in how the policy itself is learnt and dispersed.

The analysis of the Chicago model showed an initial interpretation of PB being inducted into an Americanised system. These changes were subsequently diffused into the next attempt at PB in New York City. Curiously with the original mayor of Chicago discovering the PB model in Porto Alegre, in a similar forum, the New York mayor was made aware of its success in Chicago. This highlights a very important understanding of how diffusion has been procured throughout its process of transnational transfer. Interestingly its not just "actors" who are capable of continuing the diffusion process. Russon-Gilman notes the attributes of citizens can also aid with the diffusion of a policy. New participants that undertook becoming active within the PB process in New York, spread through word of mouth the benefits of such, and as a result more citizens participated.

Cameron (2009) found in the Andean region of South America, the infrapolitics of participation are reflected in the ways in which the 'participants' in participatory budgeting schemes - now widespread through out the region - strategically adapt those schemes to pursue their own livelihood strategies in ways that neither completely depart from or completely comply with government and donor goals for participatory budgeting. Most notably, in diverse settings participants have demonstrated a strong preference for small-scale infrastructure projects that typically involve large volumes of cement but which appear to have little potential to promote social or economic development, despite the hopes of governments and donors that participatory budgeting will generate broader development impacts.

The rapid changes specifically found within the Andes in regards to PB diffusion has lead to Bolivia and Peru implementing "participation of civil-society representatives in budget making and other aspects of municipal governance". Peru has further evolved its Law, as seen in its 2003 Law of Participatory Budget, which states clearly the specific steps required in order to ensure participation in the divulging of annual budgets. Whilst this is the law and must be followed other countries such as Ecuador, have evolved in such a way that municipal governments, with the aid of NGO's have implemented such strategies of their own accord. In this instance it would seem the municipalities themselves have actively taken a stand to introduce such a method. Again if the citizens are unhappy PB provides a solution amongst a problem.

Organisations:

Paice (2014) utilises the case study of Camerron, Africa to analyse the adoption of the widely accepted model of Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting (PB) policy, acknowledging that PB has been diffused to as many as 1,500 states, cities, towns and rural municipalities in 2010. Referring to the policy as an inspiration he draws upon Cameroons "law 90", passed in 1990, which allows freedom of association and the right to form political parties. This political change allowed the formulation of individual parties, signifying a radical change in governance. This change can be similar to the context of Porto Alegre, in that the change from dictatorship to a more democratic governmental process, leading to PB.

As Graham (2013) suggested, diffusion relies on the adoption of a successful policy but adapted for its own purposes and context. This initial attraction to PB was through Africities, a convention that focuses on issues for local African governments, and could be attributed to Mayors that had already experienced PB within their municipalities acting as a catalyst in conjunction with the Law 90 passing, allowing for such PB models to be implemented.

As a result of Cameroon's efforts, diffusion occurred not necessarily transnationally but within its own differing municipalities (e.g. Batcham and Edzenoudan). The highlight of the PB was the organic creation of ASSOAL (Association des Amoureux du Livre (Society of book lovers)), which after its success and participation in the PB of Cameroon aided a further 20 municipalities. This formation of such a strong willed grassroots organisation is deemed a fundamental reason for PB being so strongly needed, as well as its further diffusion to other municipalities.

Sintomer (2010) looked at Cameroon as part of a global analysis into PB and found the limited decentralisation is a clear problem in Africa. However, these small municipalities offer a catalyst type pilot study, which have exponentially increased the promotion and introduction of decentralisation and participation as a whole. It is for these reason organisations such as the World Bank and UN have supported such policy diffusion. With this decentralisation, transparency has naturally progressed within the political system, holding to account politicians that otherwise were free to deceive the citizens of their municipalities. Whilst corruption is still a large issue the transformation on the whole has been positive.

Sintomer (2008) compares the Porto Alegre model of PB with Cordoba specifically, suggesting that the PB diffused into Cordoba should be referred to as the "ideal-type 'Porto Alegre adapted for Europe'" model. Yet in other European cities the model has been diffused much differently. For example where the focus of the model is not aimed towards the citizens. The second "ideal type" asserts more of a spotlight over "secondary associations, NGOs, unions and other organized groups". Suggesting the model is a neo-corporatist logical evolution and should be thought of as 'participation of ogranised interests'. Of course these organisations are fundamental in pivotal changes within PB, and play a concrete role in the evolutionary diffusing process. As Sintomer concedes however, there are no current countries incorporating this current model.

Sintomer (2010) found the diversity of the diffusion of the Porto Alegre PB model has spread throughout Europe with differing effects in each host country. The closest relation in terms of PB's origins can be found in Spain and Italy. Interestingly in most eastern European cities organizations such as "the World Bank, UNO, USAID, GTZ" are the initial instigators of such models. In comparison to Porto Alegre, which was an organic internal model, eastern Europe has developed an external implementation process to promote local governance.

Bassoli (2012) was one of the few academics who appreciated the role of diffusion and used the term to explore progressive evolution and its relation to contextual circumstances. The initial ripples felt by Italy in the diffusion process occurred during early 2001, after the World Social Forum. During this time period PB, or at least involving the citizens within the budgeting allocations, was a prevalent topic. In order to further explore this idea the "Charter for the New Municipality" was introduced to offer a new perspective upon how to integrate such requirements. This in association of the Global Justice Movement played a "central role in the diffusion of PB in the Italian peninsula", highlighting the importance of such NGO's in the diffusional role of PB across Europe. This led to a "boom" in PB being introduced, something not prevalent or catalytic in other European countries.

Bassoli also analysed the case of Pieve Emanuele, sometime referred to as Pieve Alegre. He appreciates that the model was a direct diffusion from Porto Alegre, hence the name, however, interestingly the PB process has evolved year after year in order to reflect local and changing needs. This change year on year, has led to a steady evolution away from the original model in order to become a bespoke system to reflect its current contextual situation. The result led to the creation of Participatory Planning Budgets, which "administrators, civil servants, and social and economic organisations" gathered in order to create an operating plan for projects selected within the budgeting allocations.

Communication:

The final North American case study involves Denver, Colorado. Haller & Faulkner (2012) focus on a new twist to the conceptual diffusion of PB, the Internet. As with all policies they evolve over time and with advances in technology its only safe to assume technology will start to play a larger role within such policy measures.

Whilst the majority of PB takes place in face-to-face meetings with the ever-increasing use and availability of technology, it offers a new directions for diffusion to head into. As with all citizens it can be difficult to organize large numbers of citizens to get a representational view. Furthermore if it involves those who are less well off or faced with poverty they are less likely to be able to attend and act in the required format. Therefore by using the Internet as a major source of communication, those with access to the internet, a large majority of citizens, they will be able to voice a previously silenced or quiet voice. This specific approach to diffusion is not a panacea to the perfect implementation and diffusion of a policy, but does mark an effective turn in transnational policy for the better.

Acioly Jr (2003) supports this contextual basis for a simplified diffusion of PB. They further this by acknowledging that in the highly urbanised areas of Latin America, living conditions were poor and formulated organization to hold the government to account by ensuring they would take care of issues such as; poor infrastructure, access to housing and basic living conditions. Such movements even generated such large numbers they were able to create regional federations to voice their opinions to those responsible. This has been the key cause as to the rise of PB, to give citizens control on what they need and allow them first hand to decide on how municipality budgets should be spent and prioritise the projects most needed. It is under these circumstances mirrored by Porto Alegre that made PB the perfect policy to diffuse, especially as the contextual background was almost exactly the same.

One evolutionary change to the diffusion process was to include the use of technology. Much like other case studies found (Haller & Faulkner, 2012) who also utilized ICT, Santo André integrated a “municipal service-SIM via Internet and telephone” which provided constant information to those who required it. A further intranet was created with over 1000 computer to ensure all had access to the information required.

Rodgers (2010) supports both Centner (2012) and Acioly Jr (2003) in as much that the implementation of such a PB model was the reaction to protest from unhappy underprivileged who required drastic help and for their voices to be heard. This resulted in an “improvised, ad-hoc initiative” that allowed PB to grow in the atmosphere of desperation and poverty the citizens were living in. As Rodgers cites the “crisis lay in the solution”. Thus paving a clear path for where PB was to head and evolve.

Convergence:

Municipalities:

Paice (2014) alludes to the issues of convergence as causal issues as to why PB had a turbulent implementation. Citing that in order for local development plans to work in association with PB there must be full support from the municipalities involved. Even when small projects need to be conducted, the municipalities control all decisions and have the final say. Paice deemed this lack of convergence a key reason as to the implementation of PB. Leduka (2009) extends this idea in that policy cannot be transnationally implemented without the acceptance of the government or institutions already in power. Without this convergence with existing structure it is near impossible to replicate the benefits only seen in the origin of the policy. He illustrated through his Mantsopa (south Africa) case study that a causal threat to successful implementation of PB was that political and administrative elites refused to hand over powers to citizens. As a result of this citizens cannot be represented or even heard as to suggestions as to how the PB could positively affect the areas.

The diffusion of PB appeared to share similarities in terms of Porto Alegre's original policy. However despite this it has been suggested that the catastrophic resentment by those in power as they see the new policy as taking away from their powers reduces the power of PB. In comparison to Porto Alegre, Brazilian municipalities are ruled by stakeholders and interests of the community. South Africa in contrast to the above hold onto their powers and control not just planning but also utilisation of resources and policymaking, making PB almost irrelevant.

Fourie & Reutener (2012) sums up their case study and in effect the whole convergence issue, at least in Africa, on the basis that a regulatory framework which can interact in the municipal sphere is key, especially as it “provides the baseline for PB”. Subsequently comprehending that the rules responsible for the three entities; citizens, organisations and authority’s. Despite relinquishing some power and some of a budget, PB offers a chance for the local authority’s to gain popularity with citizens who are able to deliberate what they require from the authority. It would be seen then that the political obstacles are the kryptonite of convergence and its theory. Without an authority willing to change its structure the use of PB is effectively useless.

Interestingly Kihm (2009) found that the participation method in Cordoba meant that the Mayor could select which participants he wished in the PB team. In effect “he looked for the right combination of experience and loyalty”, suggesting a bias and non-partisan approach to the model. His choices were based upon those who had previous experience in PB. For example Diego Bedacarratx who studied the PB structure in Rosario and Porto Alegre. These choices would not only help smoothen the diffusion process but also offer vital experience ensuring that the convergence of PB was at its most effective. The result of using such preexisting structured has led to some criticism, as academics believe there is nor room for new life and perspective as was apparent in the grass roots movement of Porto Alegre. However others have suggested that the wealth of experience and knowledge incorporated into the process has helped each organisation keep the others in check and thus created “an effective and representative PB process, against the odds”.

Bassoli (2012) when analysing the PB diffusion within Italy found 4 key factors that specifically affected the convergence:

1. Inclusion
2. Participation
3. Opposition
4. Transparency

It would seem that in Grottammare these factors have been acknowledged, at least in part. It was decided that citizens would be included within weekly meetings that took place, more specifically meetings that decided the outcomes for “political decision-making for the short

and long term". This helped fulfill all four of the criteria and lead to a successful distinctive model.

Similarly in Pieve Emanuele, a small town located near Milan, a political scandal led to the suspension of the municipal executive and consecutively led to a new centre left government being elected. This change whilst voted for by the people still contained the remnants of distrust from the previous government and so new measures were required in order to converge. As a result a participatory method was incorporated to re-establish a trust bond between citizen and politician. The result of such changes eventually led to the adoption of PB, almost as a necessary device in order to reestablish faith and unity within the government, which led to citizen satisfaction and a smooth convergence of PB into the pre-existing structures.

IBP (2000) found uneven distribution of national laws and citizen participation outside of Brazil. It suggested this may occur as Mayors are resisting the changes required to fully implement and make the PB model efficient. Perhaps even more worrying is the idea that the lack of changes are due to the clientelist approach which goes hand in hand with corruption still stands within such countries. This lack of convergence is a threat upon the success and reputation of PB. This however contravenes the origins of PB in Brazil, where no law forces mayors to implement PB, as many mayors have elicited the help for the PB model of their own accord, suggesting a valid and holistic approach to their locality.

Franklin & Ebdon (2005) looked at two case studies; Burlington, Iowa & Topeka, Kansas. The emphasis of the Topeka case study lies in the lack of convergence on the municipalities behalf. Only a public hearing was deemed more acceptable than other methods such as; focus groups or citizen satisfaction surveys. Either way the lack of interest shown by the council was evident in the presence of the public meetings. With no enforcement of council members to attend the voices of those wishing to take part in the PB process could not have their voices heard. However, due to the narrow mindedness of the council, those involved on the citizen level, banded together and united to achieve a consensus of a specific project they wanted funding for. In the survey conducted by Franklin & Ebdon citizens opinions of the councils handling of PB was very low for satisfaction.

In comparison Burlington scored very highly on citizen satisfaction. The selection of citizens wishing to delegate the feelings of the local citizens played a major part in deciding where funding was to be allocated. The information provided by the CBEC (Citizens Budget Education Committee) was formatted into a brief and circulated through local newspaper articles. The most important aspect here, is the acceptance of the council to listen to the CBEC, creating a suitable convergence of public and local authoritarian powers.

Patsias (2013) summarises a participant's best hope for a PB like structure. Montreal became one of the most decentralised cities in the world. Its funding was split between 9 major boroughs, each of which had full control of its fiscal resources. Some of this funding could also be "topped up" by tax levies and special fees". Whilst seeming to reciprocate the diffusional qualities required by the original PB of Porto Alegre, unfortunately the civil servants involved, or in this case ignored, felt their expertise was then to be wasted or threatened. Furthermore the political links created by certain members involved was to be wasted if the citizens were to have direct influence over the budgeting process.

Rodgers (2010) assessed a similar situation in which PB was formulated into the constitution of Buenos Aires and in fact became the "keystone" of it. Article one states that "the city government 'organises its autonomous institutions as participatory democracy'". Clearly a large amount of support is being given to the idea of PB, especially having been written into the constitution. However, the procedural mechanisms were meant to have been "ratified" during 2001 and the implemented model of PB was legislated by decree. As Rodgers suggests the reason perhaps for the decree perhaps was a culmination of divergence between the constitutional framework and the legislators. Thus the original draft of the constitution must have diverged from the main stream political class.

Unfortunately in some cases such as Guamote, Ecuador (Cameron, 2009) despite an effort to converge PB into the forefront of the political system, despite providing the capabilities of citizens to participate, sometimes the efforts made to improve the newly adapted model are futile. Guamote's development plan was aimed to incorporate the ideas and feelings of the citizens living in the area to better any social injustice felt. Comments regarding the NGO's and state agencies were somewhat negative and referenced specific gender and environmental issues, all of which were removed from the final document. Again this supports the idea that if citizens do not have adequate powers to fulfill their needs, upper

echelons of the political system can in some cases simply veto, ideas that could provide social justice to the citizens. More importantly this can work the other way around, in terms of the citizens attempting to utilize the PB model to serve their own interests. During the municipal budgeting meetings “productive projects” became a large concern for the citizens and in fact rated of the utmost importance in comparison to other projects suggested. As a result it was later discovered this actually referred to the distribution of pigs to Ecuadorian families, which is prohibited by law. This is a clear example of citizens attempting to utilize the PB model to bend already standing rules to better their investments in livestock.

Goldfrank (2007) raises the idea of clientelism as a reason for a less than democratic approach towards PB. It would suggest based on this that in some Latin American countries corruption is still a perverse problem. With a lack of clearly asserted goals or targets the resources can be used for almost any purpose seen fit, leading to the ostracising of rural areas who do not feature highly on the priority list, which in effect undermines the whole reason for implementing PB as a model to improve social justice. The consequence of such is a lack of participation as a whole, and thus without the support of those who need PB the most, and with no political will to serve the citizens, the model cannot converge and achieve its afformented purpose.

Central Government:

Some studies have found a natural progression towards PB. Rahman (2005) cites movement in parts of India, specifically Bangladesh. With the national government of India being election based engagement of local citizens in recent years has grown as a way of extend democracy in the country. Whilst places such as the US find it difficult to integrate a so-called ‘radical’ change to the system, it would seem Bangladesh is naturally evolving its democratic system to favor the model.

More specifically, the Capacity BUILD Project of CARE-Bangladesh (Sirajganj Project), supported the governments aims to decentralize the public decision making and so unlike many other studies actually uses PB to achieve governmental targets. Along with these targets an aim to enhance the “institutional capacity of local government’ can help foster relationships with the under privileged in the local community, providing transparency and accountability. This denotes a change from the stereotypical implementation of PB in other countries. With a focus to actively involve participants whilst also achieving governmental targets, Rahman provides expert evidence convergence can work on both a governmental and citizen level. Rahman has reinforced the support given by local citizens by way of the average of 200 to 500 participants that take part in the meetings set up, a major feat in any PB scheme.

Tobin (2014) found that the governmental targets sometimes interfered with the convergence of a policy. With targets set by the government to provide the “highest possible quality’ for the “lowest possible cost”, the premise of PB doesn’t always achieve what is required. Thus the NGO’s of Seoul have criticized the top down approach of non-participatory actions and that even with controls over the budgets, it still does not meet the needs of the citizens, which was also a main aim of the project. The final conclusion suggested that despite reform to adopt the PB process, unfortunately the changes only seemed to adhere to the previous structures and reinforce them without achieving a more “equitable” method of budgetary redistribution.

Similar to Tobin’s’ finding is Wu & Wang (2011) case study of Wuxi. They found that the Chinese government provided “neither effective administrative control within the government nor legislative oversight of government finance” and that PB could help in this governmental issue, by improving the financial accountability of the government and increase the supervisory power of budgeting. Within Wuxi, specifically, PB offers citizens a prized opportunity to directly influence the policy making process. It also adds an elemental aspect of transparency to the process, reanimating faith in the governmental actions taken. This is necessary due to the “non-electoral” nature of the political structure in China. Thus the convergence aspect here requires small changes in the structure to ensure citizens feel actively involved in the process, even if that is not the case. Therefore, much like Tobin found, the convergence of PB is only a preface to strengthen previous governmental structures already implemented.

Whilst Wenling provided two different approaches to PB, Wuxi was the more forth giving in terms of its association with convergence. It offers more insight than Wu & Wang (2011), possibly as the study was conducted a year later. However, the interesting part is that whilst the introduction of PB did support previous governmental structures, there was a semi-participatory aspect to it. By allowing the citizens selected at random to prioritise the government was able to provide projects they wanted to be completed, however gave the power to the citizens to decide in which order of priority they should be completed in. This differs from Porto Alegre's where the citizens were given full control, however taking into consideration china's government, it has surprisingly converged its governmental structure with the model of PB rather well. Resulting in citizens feeling included within the deliberation process.

Ahmad & Weiser (2006) found a convergence issue with central and local governments. The "Overlap" between the two caused issues with who was in charge and responsible for budgetary issues. However in comparison to the other two case studies it was found that Indonesia was much more adequately suited to the implementation of PB, in relation to convergence, due to its large number of NGO's already in existence. The issue that really troubles the PB implantation in Indonesia is the degree of political demand required to support such a project. It is important that when a central government has such control over changes being made to the system that they acquire the support of all local governments before commencing. It would seem this partly occurred as in 2005 and 2006 Kebumen and Makassar Shared their budgets.

Contrary to the divergence found by Rodgers (2010), Bland (20122) found overwhelming convergence within El Salvador's municipalities. This was due to the political infrastructure already present. No opposition was formed as the mayor elected wins the entire councils seats. Whilst this provides a strong political support system for the mayor, the biggest issue was opposition from the local citizens.

Further to this gradual acceptance did eventually begin to occur. During El Salvador's democratic transition there was no legal framework to or national legal requirement, which helped foster the natural occurrence of PB. It would seem the emergence of PB resulted because of the general diffusion across the rest of Latin America but also because the idea was becoming popular between international aid agencies. This therefore can highlight convergence can occur with a new 'radical' change to a country, despite war and changing governments.

Citizens:

Transparency is a key aspect of any PB model and reinforces trust between citizens and politicians in most cases. In most European cities Sintomer (2008) states that in order to accommodate a successful convergence of a new policy three main trends have been found;

1. An improvement of public services based on the proposals from citizens
2. A higher demand for co-operation between differing departments to ensure cohesion and unity in the process
3. A more efficient approach to internal administrative operations leading to a quicker response time

As with most other policy implementation this convergence can come at a cost. For example increased costs of the process and the necessary changes to the original structure.

The involvement of a "public/private negotiating table" is also broached. In this instance not all the budgetary money comes from the municipality and therefore the municipality does not have an executive decision in the PB process. This makes PB a much more all encompassing approach and leads to better cohesion as more stakeholders are involved in the core procedures. This of course contravenes from the initial PB approach delegated by Port Alegre, but does offer insight in how to converge not just citizens and the local government but also businesses in the area (for example Płock, Poland).

Transparency was a key factor in the case of Dong-ku, South Korea. Initially the task force and advisory committee set up were called into question and received wide spread incredulity from citizens and officials alike. Once the Ordinance of Participatory Budgeting

was enacted the key focus was “financial transparency and accountability, and (to) strengthen participatory democracy”. With such a focus differing to the key theme of social injustice in Porto Alegre, the skepticism could almost be comprehended. The reconciliation of the citizens and officials came in a phased concept. Firstly the citizens were involved directly in a joint decision making process. The next phases utilised elected delegates to follow through the initial proposal. To ensure the delegates were equipped they were all enrolled within the “participatory budgeting school”.

Centner (2012) found a series of issues that prevented a complete convergence with the implementation of PB. A major issue raised was that the senior citizens who formed the majority of the participatory group involved could not afford to travel to the meetings being provided. Similar to the requirement of childcare provided by Rahman (2005), in order for the citizens to interact and function as needed the government should have ensured that the meetings provided were accessible by all. Without this fundamental requirement having been achieved convergence cannot be expected to occur, especially as the PB has resulted in a change of routines for its citizens.

Furthermore certain members involved in the citizen meetings tried to use such meetings for personal gain. By trying to organize meetings in locations so that the people that would attend would have no influence upon the decisions being made. As a result decisions were not made and eventually people even walked out of the meetings as no conclusion was reached.

Unlike Acioly Jr (2003) found in Santo André, ICT was not provided to those who had no access to it. As a result, notification of meetings were often not passed onto citizens in the poorer districts, resulting in a less than socially representative group of citizens, therefore excluding the personal views of those most required in such a process. Santo André’s law system systematically ensured the convergence of PB with their laws, political systems as well as the citizens needs (Acioly Jr, 2003). The first law indicated “the social use of land and the social value of cities for the purpose of combating perverse speculation and social exclusion”, which is the primary basis for PB, to ensure social exclusion is minimised and that those who require the municipality to act do so. The second law ensures that cities with over 20,000 inhabitants to have an urban development plan based upon the popular consultation and participation of civil society organisations. These two fundamental laws

have paved the way not just for successful diffusion but also a successful convergence.

One such issue that has risen is the bias over how projects were previously chosen and that in fact mayors would prioritise certain projects in their constituency, therefore leading to disparity amongst the city. This is often furthered by the mayor ensuring that certain councilors demands for projects in their constituency's are also carried out, furthering the bias process. This divergence of the original PB policy has been looked at in detail. The changes made created a large controversy between executive and legislative powers as it devolves control to the council of Participatory budgeting. Whilst this produces a fairer less bias approach clearly the policy has not converged as successfully as people may have wished.

The Marshall Islands within Ahmad & Weiser's study presents for the first time in the field of convergence so far an indigenous culture, whose society is far more dependent upon community than cities such as New York. With emphasis placed upon extended family and much more importantly group consensus. Therefore in order to converge a PB model, the focus here will be a societal one in comparison to a political. This is not to say the political aspect does not exist, because it does, however within there cultural history and culturally relevant etiquette it is deemed unacceptable to question authority. This then presents the question of whether a policy can converge with culture and cultural context.

Organisations:

Whilst Paice (2014), Leduka (2009) and Fourie & Reutener (2012) focused on the effects of a municipality that refused to allow the integration of PB policy into their structured framework, Thompson (2012) focuses on "who will lead, design and control" the process. In Canada Bay's instance the New Democracy Foundation was set up as the balance to the equation required to achieve a non-bias input in the PB process. Their role was to control the process and strengthen the democratic value and efficacy. However, Thomson does criticize this process as the time input into the PB process. If the New Democracy Foundation charged for their time it would not be within the councils reach and so the voluntary aspect is a key door through which the PB model has travelled.

Whilst convergence is most frequently associated with the municipal or government bodies, convergence within the participants themselves is important. Participants need to agree in consensus on which schemes deserve the funding on behalf of all citizens. Canada Bay's retort to this is the creation of the Citizens panel. The citizen's panel put forwards suggestions to the council. Of course the council could reject the proposals but then the premise of PB would have been irrelevant.

Sintomer (2010) looked at a diffused version of PB in Fissel, Senegal, and its experience of convergence. The process was supported by an NGO (IED Afrique), which helped train and manage "councilors, administrators and citizens' delegates" through the process. In order to address issues fairly from non bias sources from "several homogenous groups". It focused primarily on "offset(ing) traditional practices of exclusion". This inclusive methodology was extremely successful and in fact replicated in other rural communities to great effect.

One of the biggest problem of transnational policy is when attempts are made to converge with an existing system not capable of accepting it, much like a new organ being rejected by the body. However, if certain systems are in place and ready for a new policy it can make convergence a much more attainable goal. Pinnington & Schugurensky (2009) noted how Guelph, when adopting PB as a new policy, already had a Neighborhood Support Coalition (NSC) which focused on improving the lives of those affected by disparity. It's these kinds of organic movements that can help PB converge with a higher success rate. Looking at this from an external perspective and appreciating not every transnational policy like PB requires grass roots movements, it does however indicate a model on which transnational policy can be more effectively transferred.

The Guelph case study also highlights the acceptance made by the municipal staff. They describe their own roles as being one of a guiding nature. In other words they provide information and in a way education. With any new policy attempting to be implemented, if it is to converge correctly education is clearly something important. This educational idea provides a basis to educate grass roots movements not just on how to converge with the original pre-existing structure but also how to improve and adapt it.

As with previous studies a correlation begins to appear in regards to the convergence of the policy with the original framework within participatory matters. In Canada however as Pinnington & Schugurensky note, Geulph actually enjoys a single tier municipal government making it pretty autonomous government, allowing more flexibility to be given to the citizens wishing to take part. Of course consideration must be taken in regards to corruption. Even if Chicago was afforded a similar governmental structure the previous corruption may have still refused to delegate powers to help with the new policy.

Education:

IBP (2000) found in Mexico that organisations arranged for multiple training courses in association with their newly implemented PB model. The institution El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) provided 3 training schedules as such to better the process of convergence. Initially training was given for government officials, journalist and NGO's as well as providing participants with basic knowledge of budgetary analysis. A second course trained journalists to advance their understanding of the proceedings, so that accurate and truthful reflections could be produced. Finally a course was devised specifically for NGO's, so they too could fully understand the relevance of the work they would be involved within and how to undertake the work. A final pamphlet was also created and distributed within local papers to explain to the people of the locality the importance and positive effects the PB model could have upon them and their families lives.

With many African countries having been influenced by previous colonial powers, such as the French or Portuguese, PB found "channel" in which it could tessellate with pre existing cultures and ideologies. However an interesting difference is the comparison of convergence when looking at "anglophonic" African countries. Local governments that elected officials have more political power than mayors within a close proximity, and more control over the budget is provided by central institutions. The budgetary discussions themselves often go alongside "participatory or consultative processes" which have very different objectives leading to an abrasion in relation to successful convergence. In conjunction with this specific tools used to control local and regional financial performance have been created with more impetus upon transparency and accountability. It is in these new tools, that convergence is becoming more successful throughout Africa. Organisations ergo such as "MDP-ESA (based in Harare), UN HABITAT (based in Nairobi)" have sought to teach these new methodologies

leading to a “hybridization of autochthonous” dialogue to converge issues held by both citizens and those representing decentralised structures.

In Kerala, India, in order to converge the idea of PB from Porto Alegre, two key elements were in play that helped it become successful. Firstly a huge amount of state support was provided (specifically; 373 state-level trainers, almost 10,500 trained provincial-level resource persons and 50,000 trained local activists) which choreographed a replicable and thought out methodological approach. This led to unprecedented social movement only paralleled in Latin America, specifically 10% of the 31 million inhabitants, including women. The second part allowed delegates to be elected and represent citizens in every phase that occurred within the process. Yielding to a much sort after transparent and accountable role for both politicians, representatives and citizens. These delegates were given an opportunity for “prioritising, implementing and monitoring” the demands that would eventually be implemented into the final development plans.

Cost Implications:

A major issue of convergence facing the Pakistan PB experiment is the operating costs. Major issues of such have arisen as the civil servants, whose salaries are paid using the budget, have recently had their wages increased by as much as (30-40%). Whilst possibly a necessary move on the governments part the increase in the budget to cover such changes is only 10%, which is meant to cover the additional expense. As expected this has reduced the amount of funding available for such PB costs.

Drouault (2007) analysed Cordoba's valid attempt at PB and found convergence to be very much a strong. During the first phase of implementation, previous years budgetary decisions were analysed as well as the methodology used to procure the final outcomes as an evaluative measure. Following this stage agents were selected and then trained in matters needed to understand and engage within the PB process, which changed annually. After this initial process the elected agents organized and managed the public meetings during their course within that year. Each district association and their agents organized the dates of the neighborhood assemblies.

The following phase was the assembly itself, in which discussions regarding the use of budgetary funds and for which projects were deliberated and the proposals were put forwards into the district proposal. At this point the phase would revert back to the first and again new representatives were elected. The use of the workshops acted as a reinforcing education so that those elected by the citizens were competent to the task of representing their viewpoints and needs and could interact (converge) with the already in place system. Of course some citizens would prefer one to one involvement in the process instead of a representative, which could have caused issues in the model converging effectively.

In Puente Genil Drouault found that because the city was so fragmented the administration could not rely on the citizens to organise the meetings and as a result remained the main coordinators. Interestingly whilst it could be seen as taking some power away from what is supposed to be a participatory model, in reality only the city council could really organize such meetings due to the scale of the task and as a result has helped facilitate a more organised model. However the exception was made so that could “deliberate” upon the rules of PB as well as its effects upon city plans, increasing the power held by them in a compensatory aspect.

Learning:

Intrinsically, learning is the most essential part of any transnational policy. Whilst policies in the case of diffusion, must adapt to contextual backgrounds and circumstances, convergence must appreciate the pre-existing governmental and social structures. Without learning a policy cannot evolve to its full potential on a transnational scale. Even if the learning is from a failing example, lessons can still be learnt, in fact even more so than from successful policy.

Municipalities:

Whilst the two African case studies present case in which local authorities only saw fit to divulge a small percentage (often a maximum of 10%) Fourie & Reutener (2012), discovered that municipalities with more experience of PB allow full their full budget for public decision making. Bearing in mind this was the original intention for PB, when evolving in Brazil.

An issue associated with this budgeting which may be divided between multiple neighborhoods is that some require more help than others. They do note however, the largest issues facing the PB in Africa is a lack of awareness of context in relation to the origins of PB, and skills required to not just utilise but understand the system being put into place and also a lack of adequate structures.

In terms of learning, the Italian case study as presented by Bassoli (2012) a focal point upon the political and administrative legitimacy is prevalent. This has been achieved through strong political will as well as a high level of inclusion of citizens. Secondary factors also worth detailing included; an active role by opposition (which resulted in positive changes), outward communication and effective participation. These factors have contributed to positive outcomes on the whole.

The biggest challenge that Krenjova & Reinsalu (2013) found was political consensus and financial autonomy constraints. In Tartu's case they managed to mediate such issues. One such example is the use of a neutral body to act as a go between the political infractions that occurred. As a result a non-partial body is in charge of deliberating any issues at hand as well as perfecting the process along the way.

Technology has also played a large role in the convergence of citizens within the PB process. With ICT becoming more and more apparent in such processes, reaching and communicating to citizens is becoming more efficient and in so more successful. This incorporation was key to the positive outcomes.

As a key example of PB working it demonstrates how important the communication and convergence of both the political side of PB and the participatory aspect involving the citizens really is, and that with this bond alterations can be made after the fact to better the process and effectively bespoke the policy to its contextual factors.

Shah (2009) found that in Latin American cities, PB models that didn't work often were a result of the national law creators having divergent targets, as well as reluctant officials, especially mayors. However some were more successful than other. Factors included;

- Municipal revenues sufficient to invest in programs required.
- The mayor was indigenous and therefore had more personal investment in the project
- Weak opposition
- Traditional civil values have been upheld despite conflicts towards such communities.

The effect of PB isn't always positive. Even the shining example of Porto Alegre had perverse side effects to its success in the form of unemployment (rising 78% in a time period of 19 years. Of course education and health care were improved which in the long-term can help lower the unemployment rate it still stand to reason that causational effects of a negative standing can occur.

Most scholars agree that political will, sufficient resources, and political decentralisation are necessary for successful participatory budgeting; many believe that preexisting societal organisation is also necessary. Other conditions cited below can be helpful but are not considered preconditions.

Shah found the following to be the most important in successfully implementing PB;

- Political will
- Sufficient resources
- Political decentralisation
- Social capital (Civil society associations)
- Beaucroatic competence
- Small size – least decision making units – simplistic
- Legal foundation – support from legislation

Whilst some issues stem from participants not having sufficient effect upon the budgeting process Russon-Gilman (2013) found in Chicago that sometimes the participants themselves were not representative. The PB "Steering committee" was created using "supporters and friends" of the alderman in charge of it. As a result the vast majority of those involved were found to be white affluent residents, not those originally intended to be involved in the original PB process from Brazil. This in effect sterilises the effectiveness and original use to help benefit those that are less affluent and deprived of required amenities or facilities the PB could offer them. The Chicago model stands as a direct learning curve on issues that can arise from the PB policy. These issues were directly acknowledged when the policy was further diffused from Chicago to New York. The changes made ensured that where as there was only one alderman in charge of Chicago, in New York, four were appointed. This offered a fairer system of appointment and also alleviated issues associated with "personality, ideology, and personal patronage", leading to a more "diversified" system.

After only one year of a pilot study of PB concerns were raised it was not empowering citizens in the way it should have been. Russon-Gilman (2013) noted that beyond the first year PB looked uncertain, providing "an educative example for the perils for scaling up PB and institutionalisation". The remedy suggested that until wider political support and participation maintenance could be achieved, PB was unlikely to succeed in making the changes originally envisaged.

The lessons learnt from Chicago and the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) group were formulated. This group became a guiding force for not just New York but also for other projects around the US. This acted as a learning organisation helping to diffuse the lessons of failures and successes as they progressed. The greatest aspect of the New York PB model was the educational aspect and feedback being given back. Participants felt there was "knowledge transfer and direct contact with government officials and agencies" and this was a primary reason as to the success of engaging citizens in the process. Citizens became more aware of civil politics and fostered relationships with "officials, neighbours, and (their) community space".

Learning from how to restructure governmental frameworks, fiscal processes and even from the participants themselves helps benefit the process. The policy itself must evolve too. Pinnington & Schugurensky (2009) found that some neighborhoods within their locality were over resourced and that some were under resourced. Thus the city Manager of community Development suggested a deliberation as to the resources and priorities of all the neighborhoods together. This was a natural step towards the PB process, which they referred to as an “allocation process”. A reason for such a successful and achievable solution could be that it was a simple mutation of the current policy already in effect. There was obtrusive changes being made that radicalised the system already in place.

Central government:

The biggest issues observed in Cameroon (Paice, 2014) were the “near total reliance upon central government” for the majority of funding. Even additional taxation is split between central government and the local councils, of which only 70% reaches them (councils). Bearing in mind these funding’s also have to cover the civil servants wages they are unlikely to take pay cuts to increase the funding of projects the locals deem as suitable. This is reinforced by the people of Cameroon who’s taxations are sometimes not officially collected. This is due to bribery of collectors who will take less than the tax permits to be taken. Effectively “agents strike a deal and take the cash”.

This learning curve is important in the implementation of PB as other countries similar to Cameroon may wish to implement a similar policy. By learning from the inefficiencies of such a policy can only benefit the further diffusion in other countries. From the interviews it was found the revenue collected from taxations in Cameroon increased when PB was introduced. Perhaps because citizens felt as though their taxations would go back into a system that would help with their civil needs.

Citizens:

In order to deal with exclusion the learning curve for Mantsopa introduced Batho-Pele “People first”, which aimed at including the citizens into the budgeting process. This was the intended process, however the majority of the power was still sectioned with the local municipalities and their agents. Whilst this may seem negative, it was found that participants

reacted well to being given more power than they had before and made the budgeting process “more fair” than it was previously. This reflects modestly in comparison to the Porto Alegre’s promotion of grassroots movements that created the origins of PB. This unfortunately did not occur in the Mantsopa case study. This lack of “space for movement” means a less functioning and effective participation of citizens occurs. With little knowledge of the system already in place citizens had no guidance. Thus agents had to make the process clearer and more transparent, this led to a “learning process” and divided the participants into thematic groups, making the process much more manageable. This learning whilst not making a perfect or even replicable model does provide insight on how important the learning value of policy transnationally should be effectively carried out.

Tobin (2014) found that despite the requirement of citizens to have an input upon the budgetary allocations, these requirements were not fulfilled. Although citizens had an input and ordered thematically attributed entities, (such as housing or economy) in a hierarchical structure, these were often ignored. This ignorance on the governments level creates an awareness of powerlessness that irrevocably creates dissatisfaction amongst those involved. Due to the introduction of thematically organised topics, no further detail was given as to what was entailed or contained within these “themes’. As a result decisions were being based upon blind choices without the correct information to make a logical and moral decision. Perhaps Tobin are suggesting that Korea, “born of a military dictatorship”, is simply protecting its grasp on power, whilst trying to give the illusion of empowering its citizens. Regardless of its failings it does provide a clear and cut statement that citizens opinions and their ability to influence the budgetary process is important.

Wu & Wang present similar issues with the implementation of PB as does Tobin (2014). The issues with the governmental structure, in this case, has led to the suggestion that a “fundamental restructuring of the power structure of the state would be essential”. Even more interesting is the idea that non- elected local officials should be offered incentives in order to raise interest and participation within the PB process. This is not to say citizens shy away from the opportunity, but it was noted that citizens could put forth their own view points, individually, as a result there was no cohesion of community into a resourceful community that could better achieve targets as a team.

Wu & Yang (2012) suggest that in the case of Wuxi and Wenling, the effect PB had upon the public budget was dependent upon the power given to the “people’s congress and people” of the locality. Whilst the citizens participation in budgetary decisions helped legitimise the public budgeting, the effectiveness of such was withheld by China’s “contemporary party-state system”. In order for PB to further evolve and tessellate with the People’s Congress, reforms must be made. Reforms in both the processing of the public budget as well as the power structure of the state. The effects of this not occurring will be hinging upon the further need for so call citizen budgets, they will eventually known as state budgets and PB will simply have been a historical attempt at revitalizing the system, albeit with no great effect.

Puerto Genil appears to be the most successful of the two case studies conducted by Drouault. This simplistically is down to individual citizen participation leading to a reflection of the majority of citizens not just those elected to represent them. The innovation and hands on policies, looking at real time contextual issues such as child care has cemented its modernization and evolution of an already successful model. This evolution echoes primarily the “strong will” of the government in charge and their passion to encourage the idea of PB and for citizens to have real influence in the control of the budget being allocated.

Centner (2012) found that when the city fragmented into different zones and local administrators were given authority to shape the terms of participation, both for groups and territories it lead to “politicised spaces with noticeable absences’. These absences were formed partly by groups who did not wish to take part in the PB process, or physically cannot. Subsequently there seems to be a lack of direct participation amongst the disadvantaged citizens. In order to deal with this some have been placed within “identity specific organisations” or silenced and labeled as “uneducated or misinformed”. Whilst PB’s main aim is to evoke a sense of power amongst citizens and close the gap on disparity in specific areas, it can also change the community and even social perspectives.

Goldfrank (2007) found in Curahuara de Carangas, an Aymara village in the Andean highlands, not only helped bond previously decaying relationships between indigenous organisations but also bolstered the support of involving women in the process. Of course this would suggest that the PB model hasn’t diffused, but rather the social context has diffused into their culture. In addition, Huaccana, another indigenous town, had much of its trade and neighborhood ties cut because of a guerilla movements I the area. However when

the mayor introduced PB, heightened rates of participation and inclusion have helped heal damaged social bonds and “revitalize civic associations”.

In order to learn from a project it is important to be able to collect data from different sources. In the case of PB the best source of information as to how well PB has been received is through the participants who have taken part themselves. Acioly Jr (2003) found that in the Santo André model questionnaires were distributed to the participants. On the one hand, this has brought planners and the citizens closer together, and on the other its has also forced planners to learn how to incorporate the peoples knowledge and experience into the municipalities projects and plans. Further support for the issue that women are involved is reinforced by Acioly Jr (2003)’s study of Santo André. However unlike other case studies such as India, its not the lack of female participants, its in fact the lack of female participants within the decision making process. An issue that arose in regards to this was the divergence of knowledge. The government staff possessed technical knowledge of the process, where as the representatives only held popular knowledge, which has negative effects upon the models effectiveness. To try and eradicate such issues capacity building programs have been organised which will help inform the representatives and interact more efficiently with the technical staff.

In terms of citizen investment many felt that their personal distortions were not taken into account. In addition to this, citizens were expected to fund there own journeys to meetings, use their own time and energy in order to reach meetings, irrelevant of the effects on their everyday routines. In some cases councilors ended up funding out of their own pockets some of the poorer members to ensure they could be involved in the process. A governmental will here is clearly shown but in theory the municipality should have provided methods for the citizens to participate. Regardless of this however those who involved themselves full time into the PN system felt the results were more than worth the cost to them.

Organisations:

Kihm (2009) supports that Cordoba is less effective in its diffusion of PB. The biggest issue being the lack of implementation of projects within the process. The one “beacon of light” to emerge from such an attempt at PB, is the forging of neighborhood associations and social organisations, which led to strong social links despite an ever changing political climate.

Whilst the use of NGO's is a clear factor in successfully adopting PB, there is a risk of them becoming Elitist. When no incentive is present communication between parties can all too quickly breakdown and ruin any chances of successful implementation. With this in mind it's important to focus the attention of such NGO's to ensure a common focal target can be achieved.

Suan Mon Tao, Thailand provided key support in the ideals that with basic and simple rules to follow the process is more likely to become a success. As with previous studies education has been important, as financial and political systems are so complex those with only laymen's knowledge cannot fully interpret and comprehend the tasks they have been actioned with. Sun Mon Tao exhibited financial constraints to all those involved, which lead to “predictable” outcomes, in association with strict but clear rules. Hence the outcome fostered trust between officials and citizens, a bond paramount to the success of any new policy as it puts the citizens in an equal position of knowledge and understanding.

Education:

Ahmad & Weiser (2006) cited that whilst decentralisation has occurred in Indonesia and Pakistan and that funding has been allocated to educate civil servants, there is a drastic lack of allowance to educate the legislators of the policy. As a result a lack of clarity and understanding has been uncovered. Ultimately Ahmad and Wesier are proclaiming education during the process of implementation is vital. If key actors, such as the legislators, are unaware of the aims, process and expected results, they cannot be expected to procure an efficient and meaningful output, leading to over sights and obstacles.

A final guideline of requirement is produced by Ahmad & Weiser in case further diffusion of the specific case study is to be enacted and successful:

- Clear regulatory frameworks help support participatory budgeting (e.g. correct legislation and consistency)
- External assistance can contribute to local reform efforts e.g. (assistance with budget preparation)
- Civil society must start with simple and effective methods (Educating citizens to ensure complete comprehension of all aspects)
- Access to information is vital (e.g. through newspapers, internet or radio)

Communication:

The greatest lesson from both Australian case studies was Hartz-Karp's (2012) acknowledgement of media's influence in the acceptance of PB by participants. Instead of a negative "sensationalist" aspect on their articles they encouraged the local media to contribute to the community through informing. This also led to the formation of aboriginal groups with other indigenous media outlets. This effort led to a success in regards to participation "by agencies from the three tiers of government and industry groups".

Communication has proven to be instrumental to a successful implementation of PB. Puerto Genil in comparison to Cordoba has benefited from 3 independent commissions. All three work together in order to share information between departments. This has not only modernised the city in terms of participation but also in terms of communicative efficiency. As a result less municipal staff have voiced resistance to the new policy. Clearly communication is of paramount importance in such a project with so many different voices vying to be heard.

The Mexico study analysed by IBP (200) generated a lot of media interest from journalists and public officials. Following its success the Gender and Equity Commission of the Mexican Congress requested CIDE give training on budgetary issues and even more impressively was asked by 3 separate Commissions of the Chamber Deputies to organise extensive research into the budget reforms that were ongoing. This supports the idea that PB has strengthened the knowledge, not just in terms of awareness, but in the general mechanics of PB's working.

The courses offered to the media have helped establish productive communication between the press and CIDE. Journalists regularly have asked the organisation to review articles or to give a statement on current policy issues. This has helped raise the level of reporting on budget issues and increased the amount of information and analysis available to the public.

3 key findings were documented from the educational ventures of CIDE;

- **Audience** – targeted courses were initiated to focus attention towards organisations or groups that benefited for different knowledge bases due to differing interests.
- **Timing** – having educated people after the budget had been released was a concern, however provided the necessary knowledge for the next cycle. The best timing was deemed a month before the budget was released.
- **Delivery** – the training time span utilised two full days of classes, which provides an issue for some citizens as well as government officials and press.

A common theme in most PB is the advertising of such to the citizens. Goldfrank (2007) believes the accessibility to information in Brazil is much superior to other countries as there are wider resources available to the Brazilian municipalities, as such printing and distribution of material necessary for participants is much more effective and efficient. It would also seem the Brazilian municipalities are thinking outside the box by advertising information and announcing meetings on public transport such as buses. Even poorer municipalities are stretching efforts to reach the citizens. For example the Mayor of a small fishing village, Icapuí, has begun painting the meeting times of PB meetings on the side of his house. Whilst not a conventional method or one that might be able to be replicated in a large city, it does provide evidence of how the evolution of a policy occurs in different scales, despite being in the same geographical region.

Natural Evolution:

As Drouault (2007) found, sometimes diffusion is not successful the first time around. In Cordoba, the first approach attempting to diffuse PB left certain associative organisations

feeling ostracised and not valued. Therefore a year later the city council re implemented a new approach to PB taking into account the perspectives of these associative groups. The second model thus incorporated not just citizens but also associations, allowing them to fulfill roles such as organisation facilitating and setting the agenda of meetings. The result of such action has lead to a smoother diffusion of PB as a whole.

Subsequent to this, Drouault found that women were specifically left out of the process as well as in supporting roles as actors and or representatives (linked to child care facilities). Interestingly Drouault highlights this contextual issue in his continued research. The lack of women's input and general participation in the PB process was somewhat foreseen in Puerte Genil. Hence, childcare has been incorporated into the process in order to ensure women have the maximum ability to attend such meetings and offer their knowledge and opinions to better the process and their community.


Final Results:

Final analysis table:

| | Diffusion | Convergence | Learning |
|--|-----------|-------------|----------|
| Krenjova & Reinsalu (2013) | Y | N | Y |
| Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke (2008) (i) | Y | Y | Y |
| Kihm (2009) | Y | Y | Y |
| Drouault (2007) | Y | Y | Y |
| Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke (2008) (ii) | Y | Y | Y |
| Bassoli (2012) | Y | Y | Y |
| Cameron (2009) | Y | Y | N |
| Wu & Wang (2012) | Y | Y | Y |
| Wu & Wang (2011) | Y | Y | Y |
| Rahman (2005) | Y | Y | N |
| Ahmad & Weiser (2006) | Y | Y | Y |
| Tobin, Hyunkuk, Wohnhyuk & Campbell (2014) | N | Y | N |
| Thompson (2012) | Y | Y | N |
| Hartz-Karp (2012) | Y | Y | Y |
| Paice (2014) | Y | Y | Y |
| Leduka (2009) | Y | Y | Y |
| Fourie & Reutener (2012) | Y | Y | Y |
| Russon-Gilman (2013) | Y | N | Y |
| Pinnington, Lerner & Schugurensky (2009) | Y | Y | Y |
| Franklin & Ebdon (2005) | Y | N | Y |
| Musso (2007) | N | Y | Y |
| Patsias 2013 | Y | Y | Y |
| Haller & Faulkner (2012) | Y | Y | N |
| Centner (2012) | Y | Y | Y |
| Acioly Jr (2003) | Y | Y | Y |
| Rodgers (2010) | Y | Y | Y |
| Bland (2011) | Y | Y | Y |
| Goldrank (2007) | Y | Y | Y |
| International Budget Project (2000) | Y | Y | Y |
| Sintomer, Herzberg & Allegretti (2010) | Y | Y | Y |
| Shah (2009) | Y | N | Y |
| Traub-Merz (2011) | Y | Y | Y |


Table 2: Table showing validation of current academic discourse (Source: Author)

Diffusion Radar Graph:




Graph 1: Radar Graph showing Validation of current academic discourse in the topic of diffusion (Source: Author)

Convergence Radar Graph:



Graph 2: Radar Graph showing Validation of current academic discourse in the topic of Convergence (Source: Author)

Learning Radar Graph:



Graph 3: Radar Graph showing Validation of current academic discourse in the topic of Learning (Source: Author)

Chapter 5 - Analysis:

Diffusion:

The results from the meta-analysis have shown context to be a fundamental part of the diffusionary process. In the majority of cases reference was made to Porto Alegre and its need for social justice. Whilst this specific context doesn't necessarily apply to all the municipalities attempting to diffuse the PB model, clearly a similar requirement of need is necessary. For example: Municipalities, or even governments, requiring transparency within the process to regain trust due to previous political party's affiliation with corruption.

The diffusion process itself is very complex. From the analysis very few municipalities were willing to risk being the first to implement a new policy that adversely changes the previous system. Those that braved new territory in implementing a new policy found positive reactions regardless of the final outcome being a success or a failure.

Whilst the efforts of the government, municipalities and citizens were key, the most useful organisation were the grassroots organisations, similar to those found in Porto Alegre. In some instances the NGO's were so successful they in fact instigated further diffusion due to their specific set of knowledge. It is this knowledge that is key in diffusing policy in the correct manner and utilising actors involved that had a direct effect on the successful implementation in other municipalities. This communication is vital in the success of diffusion.

Communication itself proved to be important in all three topics of transnational policy, but no more so in the specific area of diffusion. The use of forums was on the whole the most common reason for diffusion. Those NGO's that had helped implement a new model often attended conferences and other forums to offer their knowledge and experience to other countries. In this respect a gateway of education was opened to help other municipalities with issues, by offering an adaptable model to suit individual needs. This not to say each time the model was diffused correctly, but does highlight the need for a communication network in order to better understand an innovative model.

Convergence:

Convergence was the ultimate reason for success or failure. Each time the PB was implemented, its new system was required to integrate into a pre-existing system. In most cases this was met with opposition, whether it be from citizens who couldn't attend the new meetings set up due to their lifestyle, or municipalities who refused to devolve the power to the citizens as is required by the PB model. The most successful cases altered their legal system in order for the model to converge correctly. Those who ignored the need for change, in the case of local authorities, often found a lack of participation and thus an inefficient use.

Education surprisingly was a common feature in most case studies. In some instances local authorities lacked the technical knowledge to incorporate the new system with their previous, leading to inconsistency and confusion between departments. In others, the citizens required education on how the budgetary system was to be implemented and how they should analyse and react to their new roles. The NGO's in the case of education played a key buffer between the local authority and the citizens. They provided knowledge and a platform in which both sides could clearly communicate with each other. Municipalities that ignored such requirements again found confusion, resulting in poor attendance and a lack of results.

Cultural relativism featured throughout the convergence analysis of the case studies. In many developing countries women were not involved in the process. Some municipalities endeavored to correct this by offering childcare for mothers who couldn't attend because of their duties as mothers. Whilst this may not form a feature in the developing world, it does highlight the need to understand cultural discrepancies. In other countries the convergence of the new model actually brought communities together. In effect this can highlight the power new policies can have on communities and to alter the social divergence apparent in so many developing countries.

Learning:

Without the learning process the models diffused in the variety of municipalities could not have progressed. The evolution of a policy through its transnational journey is varied and sometimes problematic. The lessons learnt from a primary host, plays a key role in its later diffusion to other municipalities. Whilst many municipalities would only adopt a successful

model, it is the lessons learnt from unsuccessful policy models that can play a role in the success of its transfer elsewhere.

Lessons often could be subdivided into diffusion lessons and convergence lessons. Whilst a variety of lessons stood out, the most perverse lesson revolved around communication, in both topics. The need to devolve power to citizens was clearly deemed necessary in many cases, but helping the citizens understand their role within the process was often problematic. Many municipalities ventured into new methods of educating citizens as previously mentioned in relation to NGO's, such as setting up workshops. This was also a requirement for some local authority's that lacked the necessary skills to fulfill the needs of the PB model. Those who educated both local authorities and citizens reaped the largest reward. This education created a basis for communication and more importantly understanding. This understanding leads to clarity and an ability to communicate on a new topic for both parties. Working together in an equally new environment for both sides often lead to new relationships being made in the community, relations that lead to healthier results and less opposition.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion:

The final results of the matrix provide insight into the validity of current transnational policy theory. Clearly almost all of the case studies support current literature with few exceptions. This supports the hypothesis that current literature and discourse does support transnational policy theories. Noticeably the least supportive of current discourse is the topic of learning. As the most important and crucial feature within transnational policy it highlights a need for more research. Without learning from policy issues and successes, in the case of PB, it makes it difficult to further research and better other policies.

Whilst the main focus of the research paper was to validate the current theory's regarding transnational policy, important insights have been raised regarding PB within this report. Diffusion seems to be a clear and necessary part of transnational policy. The analysis showed how important the understanding of social and political backgrounds can be. When diffusing the PB model the most successful cases acknowledge the background of Porto Alegre, the most efficient and well-respected case. Interestingly, PB in Porto Alegre has evolved into a different type of policy, and the reason for this is that the original intentions of holding government and municipalities to account and allowing for participation has now been achieved, albeit with some knock on effects. These effects being better social justice for the people but with a higher rate of employment. This allows us to conclude that transnational policy can only transfer a policy in its real time state. When other countries diffuse the policy they cannot continue to make changes as the original policy evolves, making time a crucial variable in the process.

The biggest obstacle diffusion appeared to be the acceptance of the original policy and its purpose. Many countries tried to adopt the policy to improve; social justice for citizens and to allow for better transparency, however, some countries appeared to use PB as a social control method, without actually devolving the powers to the citizens. In these instances the PB appeared weak, and achieved very little.

The results also showed how important convergence can be in the success of a policy such as PB. Many countries adopted the model but did little to change the structures already in place to accommodate for the new model. As a result it couldn't tessellate within their municipality and was viewed as weak and inefficient. In many cases where this participation was low and the model was seen as a failure. The countries that created; new organisations, rearranged municipality structures and altered even the legal framework, were better suited to adopting PB. The requirement of change is often asserted from the social injustice impacting upon citizens and requires a change for the better. If the model is not perceived as positive a lack of participation will ensue and the model will have little value, except in the eyes of municipalities, who may use the model to reinforce previous governmental structures.

The learning aspect of PB was limited in some cases, however extremely prevalent in others. It brought forth new ideas to help PB evolve and better help the local authorities attempting to invest in such a model. One example would be the acknowledgement that in many countries women are not involved within the participatory meetings. The exclusion of such a large sect of any population degrades the concept of social justice. Hence in some adaptations of the PB model childcare was provided for mothers so they could attend and offer what is a key opinion within any municipality. Communication appeared to be the best device in diffusion and convergence. The use of technology has become predominant in many implementations of PB and a key factor in reaching citizens in the most deprived areas. This move forward is becoming more and more apparent in the more recent case studies, and marks a significant evolution of the PB model.

All three topics discussed have provided what could be classed as basic framework for transnational policy. Whilst PB is only one policy and cannot be applied to all policies aiming to be transnationally transferred and implemented, there does seem to be a cyclical pattern. Initially a successful policy is diffused transnationally to another country. This diffusion has to take into account the context in which a policy was created. With this in mind the next step is to converge the said policy into its new surroundings. This again can only be achieved through alterations to the new hosts structures. This applies both to governmental structures as well as citizen and organisations. Finally, lessons must be learnt from its diffusion and convergence. From this the policy can evolve of its own accord and tessellate into the very problem looking to be solved. Poignantly the learning curve acts as brief for closer non-

transnational locations, perhaps other municipalities within that country. The process will then repeat with other municipalities becoming aware of the new policy being implemented and them attempting to repeat the process again. This refinement of the policy does make transnational policy transfer and implementation possible on a transnational scale.

Further research however must be done on the topic of transnational policy. Globalisation is a relatively new phenomenon, hence why such little research is currently available. Every major continent now has adopted PB in some form or another, highlighting that transnational policy certainly exists. With more and more countries now willing to try PB more research can be conducted. Ideally enough research can be formulated to provide a framework on how to transfer such policies and make them as successful as the origins of the model in question.

This marks a positive step forward in the discourse of transnational policy. With new and effective policies having been organically nurtured, it is now possible to transfer them into not just local municipalities in a close proximity, but on a global scale. As a result planning policy can be bettered in all corners of the globe. The reason for such communication. Throughout each case study the effectiveness of each model came down primarily to communication. It is communication that allowed the host country to gain knowledge of the policy and communication at the end of its implementation that allowed other municipalities to transfer the adapted model.

To further this research more attention could be focused upon the organisations that instigate and spread the knowledge of transnational policies. Some governments are keen to let others implement a risky new policy than others. However it is these risks that have led in most cases to better communication between governments and their citizens respectively.

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